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Abstract 
This paper takes as its main focus the intersection of young people’s international mobility 
within Europe with a number of youth life transitions – from education to work, from 
unemployment to employment, and, more widely, from ‘youth’ to ‘adulthood’. It surveys both 
the extensive empirical literature on European youth migrations and a number of theoretical 
approaches which help to conceptualise and understand this youth-mobility phenomenon. 
Three categories of young intra-EU migrants are identified: students who are studying abroad, 
graduates who are working or seeking work abroad (the ‘higher-skilled’), and non-graduates 
working or looking for work abroad (the ‘lower-skilled’). The age-band is 16-35 years, 
although we acknowledge that ‘youth’ and ‘young adults’ are flexible categories. We also 
problematise the notion of skill and its various levels. Amongst the theoretical lenses we deploy 
to frame youth mobility are economic theory (neoclassical and ‘new economics’), social 
networks, life-course studies, temporal conjunctures (EU enlargement, the 2008 ‘crisis’), and 
core-periphery dynamics. The three longest sections of the paper review the empirical and 
theoretical literatures on mobile students and higher- and lower-skilled workers. The 
concluding discussion reviews policy measures taken at EU, national and local levels. 
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Introduction 
The central concept of this review paper is that the geographical mobility of young persons 
(defined pragmatically as those aged between 16 and 35) provides a strategy for negotiating a 
number of crucial life-course transitions, notably those from study to work, from 
unemployment to employment and, more widely, from ‘youth’ to ‘adulthood’ (Corijn and 
Klijzing 2001). Henceforth, when we refer to ‘youth mobility’, we imply spatial mobility, 
which of course interacts in various ways with socio-economic mobility. Our task in this review 
is twofold: both to survey the existing empirical literature on young-adult geographical 
mobility in Europe (mainly but not exclusively international mobility) and to advance a range 
of theoretical perspectives from which this prominent human phenomenon can be interpreted. 
The review comes at a time when, across Europe, but especially in the more economically 
vulnerable peripheral member-states, there is a crisis of youth unemployment and a general 
scenario of labour-market precarity. Hence there is a broad need to assess whether international 
youth mobility, especially to the more prosperous member-states, some of which are 
experiencing specific skills shortages, may be an effective strategy to achieve the fabled ‘triple-
win’ outcome. This is when, as a result of migration, economic benefits accrue to the sending 
regions (exporting surplus labour, receiving inflows of remittances), to the receiving regions 
(which needs certain types of youthful labour) and to the migrants (who improve their material 
wellbeing and life chances). 
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 Following the Horizon 2020 YMOBILITY project, of which this paper is a key initial 
output,1 we categorise mobile ‘youth’ into three types based largely on educational status: 
 
 students who are studying at university or some other educational institution in another 
European country; 
 graduates who are working or seeking work abroad – ‘higher-skilled’; 
 non-graduates who are working or seeking work abroad – ‘lower-skilled’. 
 
These are by no means watertight categories, and there are attendant problems of definition, 
notably over the notion of skill level, which will be addressed in due course. Moreover, 
international mobility may be precisely the mechanism through which individuals transit from 
one category to another – from university to high-skilled employment for instance, or from 
school to low-skilled jobs, or even (as we shall see) from higher-skilled (but poorly paid) 
employment in their home country to low-skilled (but better-paid) employment in another 
country. 
 This overview paper is presented in several sections as follows. The next three sections 
are dedicated to ‘clearing the ground’ – we address the key questions underpinning our review 
and analysis; the hypotheses and possible causal mechanisms which trigger and explain youth 
mobility, especially in contemporary Europe; and important issues of the definition of key 
concepts. The succeeding section examines and unpacks the notion of youth transitions. Then, 
in the three longest sections of the review, we survey the fast-growing literatures on the three 
types of youth mobility – students, high-skilled workers and lower-skilled workers. We 
conclude the review with some policy perspectives.  
 
 
Key questions 
Four key questions underpin all migration processes and episodes: Who? Where? Why? and 
How? In a bit more detail: 
 
 Who migrates (and who does not)? Does migration draw away a representative cross-
section of the population of the sending region/country, or are there social, economic, 
demographic, ethno-cultural or regional filters? 
 Where are people migrating to? Are there preferred destinations? What are the patterns of 
migration expressed in space and time – for instance as intense flows to particular 
destinations, or as more diffuse and gradually evolving flows? 
 Why do people migrate? This is perhaps the most fundamental question of all in migration 
research and, like the first question, it needs to be paired with its counterfactual: Why do 
                                                          
1 This paper is a revised version of one of the first deliverables of the Horizon 2020 YMOBILITY project (‘Youth 
Mobility: Maximising Opportunities for Individuals, Labour Markets and Regions in Europe’), grant no. 649491, 
which runs for three years from 1 March 2015 to 28 February 2018. The deliverable is D1.2 of Work Package 1, 
which is coordinated by the University of Sussex team. Drafts of this paper were presented and discussed at the 
YMOBILITY project meetings in Riga, 20-21 July 2015, and in Almeria, 9-10 March 2016. Thanks to many 
YMOBILTY project partner members for useful inputs into discussion. 
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people stay put? The probable determinants of migration include a range of economic, 
demographic, social and psychological factors which are mainly expressed at the individual 
level, together with meso-level factors related to networks, channels and organisations, and 
the macro-structure of political economy, including regional inequality and financial crisis. 
These hypothesised migration drivers are described in more systematic detail in the next 
section, and will then echo throughout this review paper. 
 How do people migrate? Although migration is often conceptualised as an individualised 
action, it rarely takes place without at least some reference to other social groups, including 
family, friends and peer groups. It may also be framed by specific networks and channels, 
as noted above. Also relevant here are the means of travel when migrating, especially their 
cost. 
 
These four questions constitute the essence of the migration process itself, but it is also 
important to interrogate the impacts of migration – on the regions of arrival, the regions of 
departure, and the migrants themselves. 
 
 For the regions of arrival, what impact does youth migration have on the economy, labour 
market and social environment, and what are the main issues surrounding the integration 
of young-adult migrants? 
 For the regions of origin, does the departure of large numbers of youthful migrants distort 
the age-structure, leading to an ageing society? Is there a registered decline in 
unemployment? Are there worries over brain drain? How do migrants keep in touch with 
‘home’ – for instance by return visits, sending remittances, and other forms of 
communication? What are migrants’ intentions of return migration? 
 For the migrants, to what extent do they objectively and subjectively feel that they benefit 
from their migration experience – for instance in terms of accessing better jobs, higher 
incomes, better career prospects, better study opportunities, and overall improvement in 
their sense of well-being and life satisfaction? How is their identity affected? Do they still 
identify strongly with their home country or are other identities fashioned in migration – 
European, global or related to the host country? 
 
 
Hypothesised determinants of youth mobility 
Standard migration theory has many explanations for why migration and mobility occur, and 
most of them apply, to a greater or lesser measure, to youth migration. Here is not the space 
for an extensive review of the hypothetical determinants of migration/mobility; these are ably 
spelled out in the general texts on migration (for instance Boyle et al. 1998; Castles et al. 2014: 
25–54; Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Samers 2010: 52–120). Simplifying a very large body of 
literature and theory, the determinants of migration can be seen to exist at four levels: individual, 
family/household, meso-level social networks and channels, and macro-structures relating to 
spatial economic inequality and time-dependent macro-economic trends. We now take each 
level in turn, drawing on hypothetical and common-knowledge links to youth migration in 
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Europe where appropriate. These links will be firmed up in our empirical review of the three 
migrant types (students, high- and low-skilled workers) in later sections of the paper. 
 Despite the attractiveness of this multi-level framework for exploring the determinants 
of migration, we are still some way short of a comprehensive understanding of why some 
people migrate and others, who may have very similar characteristics to the movers, do not. 
Several key interventions published in the 1990s (Fischer et al. 1997; Hammar and Tamas 1997; 
Massey et al. 1993) all commented on the relatively limited understanding of who migrates 
and who does not. This is still largely the case today. Nevertheless, we hold to the view that a 
multi-scale analysis of the potentially relevant determining and structuring factors holds out 
the best hope of an integrated and relatively ideologically neutral understanding of what ‘drives’ 
migration, with special reference to youthful Europeans in the 21st century. 
 
 
Individual mobility: the micro scale 
At the micro-level of the individual, there are three broad sets of factors that have been 
hypothesised as determinants of migration/mobility – demographic, socio-economic and 
psychosocial. Of course, these subgroups of factors can become blurred or combined, either 
simultaneously or sequentially but, for the time being, they are kept analytically separated. 
 The main individual-scale demographic factors which are likely to be contributing 
determinants of migration are age, gender, generation and level of education. Also potentially 
relevant are family context – marriage/partnership, existence of children, number of siblings 
and even birth order (since this can relate to care duties towards parents, inheritance patterns 
etc.). Clearly, youth defines our focus here on younger-age migrants, although there are other 
demographic and kinship factors to be taken into account, such as the composition of the 
migratory unit, which could involve other family members migrating at the same time, or a 
joining process with other family members already abroad. At an aggregate level, it is well-
documented that spikes in migration propensity cluster around the two main education-to-work 
transitions which occur at late teens for school-leavers and early–mid 20s for university leavers 
(King et al. 2006).  
 Although many intra-European mobility flows are made up of roughly equal numbers 
of men and women, there are some imbalances, related mainly to the structure of labour-market 
needs and opportunities. The gendered segmentation of labour niches has become a well-
documented aspect of global migration flows at least since the 1950s and 1960s, when Europe’s 
guestworker migrants (mainly men) were recruited to staff the factories and building-sites of 
the fast-growing industrial economies of France, the UK, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland (Berger and Mohr 1975; Piore 1979). More recently, and especially 
since 2004, we observe a similar male predominance in lower-skilled migrant-worker flows 
from countries like Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania into the construction and other 
casual-labour sectors of the UK, Ireland, Germany and the Nordic countries. On the other hand, 
female-majority flows are often associated with the caring professions and include the cases of 
Portuguese nurses recruited to the supply-deficit health sector in the UK, or au pair migrants. 
Many student mobility flows, especially language-based exchange programmes, are also 
female-majority. 
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 The individual-scale economic drivers of youth migration largely rest on human capital 
theory – on the notion that an ‘investment’ in migration, either for work or for study, produces 
benefits which will eventually outweigh the costs of the move (Sjaastad 1962). This approach 
provides insights into which migrants tend to migrate to which destinations, and for how long, 
and into changes over time in their earnings and benefits-to-cost ratio (Dustmann 1999; 
Dustmann and Kirkchamp 2002; Dustmann and Weiss 2007). Unemployment, or the fear of 
unemployment, also constitutes an important economic trigger for youth migration 
(Blanchflower and Shadforth 2009). 
 Secondary data constraints mean that most human capital research on migration has 
depended on education or qualifications as surrogates of skills. This has meant a focus on 
technical skills, and fails to analyse the ‘softer’ social skills possessed, or acquired, by migrants. 
This gap has been addressed by Williams and Baláž (2005, 2008), who focus on the concepts 
of tacit knowledge and competences (cf. Evans 2002). Based especially on their research on 
young Slovakian migrants, Williams and Baláž analysed a range of competences (including 
values and attitudes, social and interpersonal skills, reliability, language knowledge etc.) that 
can only be acquired through face-to-face proximity and more-or-less deep immersion into the 
culture of the destination country. Language skills are often found to be particularly important 
in enhancing earnings and career trajectories (Dustmann 1999). 
 Through migration, individuals acquire not only skills and competences, but also a 
broader cultural experience from the places and countries they migrate to. This can be regarded 
as an absorption and enhancement of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) or the acquisition, 
perhaps, of a more general transnational habitus (Kelly and Lusis 2006) deriving from the 
experience of international mobility and living across and between two or more countries. 
Writing of the recent youth emigration surge from Ireland, Cairns et al. (2013) and Moriarty et 
al. (2015) have stressed the mobility habitus that young Irish graduates have by virtue of the 
historically embedded culture of migration in Irish society. Yet another term which has gained 
traction when referring to the personal, deployable benefits derived from frequent travel and 
spells of living abroad is mobility capital – applied by Murphy-Lejeune (2002) to the intra-
European experiences of Erasmus students and language assistants. 
 From a more psychological perspective, individual personality characteristics are 
important. Boneva and Frieze (2001) have written about the migrant personality: compared to 
non-migrants, migrants tend to be more work-orientated and to have higher achievement 
motivations, whilst ‘stayers’ are more tied to their families and home-based social networks 
(Cairns 2009; Reher 1998; Van Dalen and Henkens 2012). Other literature which specifically 
utilises the concept of migrant personality includes research on students (Frieze et al. 2006) 
and on migrant workers (Polek et al. 2011). A final element of the psychosocial make-up of 
migrants is their hypothesised tolerance towards risk and the way in which they manage risk in 
their lives (Williams and Baláž 2012).  
 
 
Family and household: the ‘micro-meso’ scale 
Moving from the individual to the family-household level – a small but significant up-scaling 
to what we call the ‘micro-meso level’ – produces new framings of why and how young people 
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migrate. Although the general construction of youth mobility is that this is an independently 
activated migration stream of individuals, this is by no means always the case. First, young 
people may be embedded in family migration – going abroad as teenagers or young adults with 
their parents. This whole-family migration usually involves children who are younger, but 
older children are not excluded, particularly if there are younger siblings involved and/or if 
there are strong economic motives driving the migration of the primary migrant breadwinner(s), 
the parent(s). The difficulties of managing ongoing educational needs may be eased by going 
to an international school, where there may be better possibilities for continuing in the same 
language and curricular system (such as the international baccalaureate). Or the family move 
may coincide with the transition from school to higher education, or from education into the 
labour market. For family migration in a lower-skill context, the younger generation may be 
more limited to lower-wage manual employment when abroad. 
 Another family-driven mechanism for youth migration occurs when migrants join other 
family members already living abroad – either their siblings or, less commonly, one or both 
parents who, having migrated some time earlier, left the son/daughter in the care of other family 
members (the remaining parent, grandparents, aunts/uncles, older siblings, or to live 
independently). But such family solidarity is not always the norm, and a not inconsiderable 
share of youth migration occurs as a result of, or reaction to, some kind of family rupture 
(parents’ separation or death, bankruptcy, or the need to ‘escape’ a difficult family environment 
etc.). 
 
 
Networks and channels: the meso level 
If the family-household scale can be considered the ‘micro-meso’ level, more solidly meso-
level factors pertinent to youth mobility in Europe include a variety of social and community 
networks, business networks and recruitment channels for the higher-skilled, and educational 
networks for students. Networks play a particularly important role in overcoming barriers to 
migration, such as reducing the uncertainties related to finding jobs and accommodation, and 
negotiating administrative and bureaucratic procedures (Boyd 1989); their importance and 
nature varies between students, skilled and unskilled migrants (Cairns 2010; Jordan and Düvell 
2003), and, often markedly so, by gender. According to Faist (1997), the ‘crucial meso-level’ 
is an overlooked layer of analysis in explaining migration, interposed between the individual 
and larger structures such as the nation-state. Although not the whole story, social capital is 
particularly important in understanding the volume of international migration, the mechanisms 
at work, and who migrates, via individuals’ links to chain migration, migrant associations and 
ongoing patterns of friendship and cooperation within various social groups (Faist 1997: 188).  
 
 
Spatial and temporal structures: the macro scale 
In contrast to the relatively recent incorporation of meso-scale factors into migration research, 
macro-scale factors have a longer history of being seen as important shaping structures of 
migration flows, especially at regional and international scales. Two of the historical bases of 
a macro-regional approach to framing labour migration flows are the Lewis (1954) dual-sector 
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growth model, applied to postwar Europe by Kindleberger (1967); and the ‘Third-Worldist’ 
model of dependent development within a global centre-periphery system (Frank 1969; 
Wallerstein 1974), applied to Europe by Seers et al. (1979). The Lewis–Kindleberger line of 
analysis sees accumulation in the industrialising capitalist sector of the European economy, 
located in the advanced core regions of the continent (traditionally, North-West Europe during 
the 1950s–1970s), fed and sustained by transfers of seemingly unlimited supplies of labour 
from the rural, semi-subsistence regions of the periphery. During these early postwar decades 
of rapid industrial growth and mass labour migration, there was a ring of the poorer, outer 
countries of Western Europe which constituted an unmistakeable labour periphery: in the north, 
Finland; in the west, Ireland; and to the south, a sweep of Mediterranean countries from 
Portugal through Spain, Southern Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Later in this paper we 
shall see how some of these periphery-to core migration flows have been resurrected since the 
1990s, with an eastern periphery added after 1989, and especially after the ‘A8’ enlargement 
of 2004. This time the migrants are not poorly educated rural-origin workers but a diversity of 
more-highly educated workers and students. 
 
 
Definitions 
Across all social science, definitions are necessary and helpful, but also often problematic. 
More often than not, they need to be carefully interrogated and even deconstructed. The toolbox 
of terms, concepts and categories that we deploy in this paper is no exception. 
 
 
Migration vs mobility: ‘liquid migration’ in Europe 
The first definitional issue is whether we are dealing with migration or mobility. The answer is 
both, but we need to be clear in distinguishing between these overlapping and competing 
concepts. Mobility is privileged by its inscription within the title of the wider project of which 
this paper is the launching-pad: YMOBILITY stands for Youth Mobility (and also Why 
Mobility?). But the project is really about youth migration in Europe since we research young 
people who have been a minimum of at least six months in another country, and returnees who 
have been at least six months back in their home country. Hence migration is about moving but 
then staying put for a certain length of time. 
 However, we also observe an increasing use of the term mobility in the study and 
portrayal of migration nowadays, especially within Europe. We suggest that there are both 
political-ideological reasons for this, and changes in the phenomenology of European 
migration. In their recent review of EU FP7 research on migration, King and Lulle (2016: 30–
31) note a discursive shift in the terminology used by the European Commission, as well as by 
other international bodies such as IOM (2008) and UNDP (2009), away from ‘migration’ and 
towards the arguably more neutral term ‘mobility’. Migration has a history now of being seen 
as a ‘threat’ in many European countries – none more so than the UK in the Conservative-
government eras. ‘Migration’ implies that migrants will stay for some time, perhaps for good, 
and become a burden on the welfare state. ‘Mobility’ signals that people will not stay but move 
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on, either back to their home country or onwards to another one. And there are, as King and 
Lulle argue (2016: 26–33), new geographies and new temporalities of European migration, 
especially since Europe’s opening to the East. East-West shuttle migration, long-distance 
commuting, extended business visits, seasonal and circular migration, student exchanges, 
working holidays, transit migration – all these relatively ‘new’ forms of movement serve to 
blur the distinction between migration and mobility. 
 The linear bipolarity and fixity of the conventional construction of migration (a move 
from country A to country B, perhaps followed by a return to A) is challenged by these much 
more complex mobility regimes and trajectories, with their greater variability in time and space. 
Engbersen and Snel (2013) have advanced the seductive phrase ‘liquid migration’ to connote 
these new, more flexible and unpredictable forms of human mobility in the post-enlargement 
space of Europe. We also note a trend to describe intra-European migration as ‘mobility’, 
reflecting the EU’s ethos of ‘free movement’, whereas immigration from outside Europe (or 
more precisely the EU and the European Economic Area) of ‘third-country nationals’ is 
labelled ‘migration’ (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 3; see also Recchi 2015). 
 We also need to acknowledge that a preference for the term ‘mobility’ has been given 
an intellectual boost by the advent of the so-called ‘mobilities turn’ in the 2000s. Inspired by 
books by Cresswell (2006) and Urry (2000, 2007), the notion of society being increasingly 
characterised by regimes of mobility of various types, and less by the ‘old’ concepts of class, 
career, residence and sedentarism, has taken firm hold in some quarters. In the mobilities optic, 
migration is just one form of human mobility, alongside both other forms of corporeal mobility 
(walking, travel, tourism, commuting, visiting etc.) and other mobile phenomena in real or 
virtual motion (material goods, capital, imagined travel, communication of messages and 
images etc.). An interesting multi-mobility focus is how different rhythms of mobility are 
enfolded within each other – for instance the relatively frequent rhythm of visiting home is 
encased within the longer-range migration for work or study abroad (King and Lulle 2015).  
 
 
Youth: a process of ‘becoming’ 
The second key term to be unpacked here is youth. Like other age-related categories (childhood, 
middle age, old age etc.), youth is defined less in relation to fixed chronological age (on which 
there is no agreement anyway), and more as a life-course category which is socially and 
culturally constructed. The conceptualisation of youth varies from one society and culture to 
another, and perhaps also by class, gender and ethnicity. Youth is also expressed contextually 
and situationally; in other words it is a ‘plastic’ concept which can be moulded to fit changing 
circumstances, even moods. Above all, it is a relational category, seen in relation to, and in 
transition between, other age- and generation-related categories such as childhood, adulthood, 
middle age etc. It is both self-identified and externally ascribed – but these two perspectives 
might not match up, so that an individual may see him/herself as youthful, but be seen otherwise 
by the wider society (or vice versa). 
 In an important intervention into the study of youth and youth transitions, Worth (2009) 
argues for youth as a process of becoming – a dynamic temporal evolution oriented above all 
to the future rather than to the past or even to the present. Worth proposes the concept of futurity 
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to demonstrate how the process of becoming can embrace the inherent complexities of 
contemporary youth transitions. 
 In most Western societies, there is a general tendency to extend the youthful way of life 
into later chronological ages. This partly reflects the youth-dominated culture of such societies, 
sometimes verging on an obsession with youthful ‘looks’ and activities, and is reflected in such 
aphorisms as ‘40 is the new 30’, ‘70 is the new 50’ etc. Consumer culture, linked to selling 
sports and lifestyle products, clothing, cosmetics and grooming products, also feeds this ‘youth 
cult’, generating profit for many businesses. But the extension of the youth life-stage to other 
biological ages is also a result of external economic and cultural factors which are beyond the 
scope of individuals to control – the delayed access to satisfactory work and income, the 
difficulty of getting on the property ladder, and therefore the generally delayed transition to the 
‘full adulthood’ stage of career, property ownership, spouse/partner, starting a family etc. 
 
 
Skills, competences, and the ‘learning migrant’   
The third and final problematic term to be considered in this review of definitions is skill. The 
established dichotomy between skilled and unskilled, or between higher and lower skilled, is 
an obvious oversimplification. All migrants have the capacity to acquire skills and other 
competences, so the emphasis should also be on the learning migrant as well as on static 
measures of skills endowment defined by specific education levels or training qualifications 
(Williams and Baláž 2008). Conradson and Latham (2005) urged researchers to focus on so-
called ‘middling migrants’ and not only on the high-skilled professionals and the poverty-
driven labour migrants. In their stimulating essay on ‘the human face of global mobility’, Favell 
et al. (2006) likewise critique the falsely polarised migrant worlds of ‘elites’ and ‘proles’ 
(proletarians). Beyond the ‘frequent-flying, fast-lane, global elites’, who are more common in 
‘glossy magazines or corporate brochures… lie other socially differentiated realities…: 
students, nurses, mid-level technical and clerical employees, ambitious or adventurous 
upwardly mobile middle-classes, migrants from a range of intermediate developing states, and 
many more…’ (Favell et al. 2006: 2). 
 There is no consensus on who counts as a ‘skilled’ or ‘highly skilled’ person or migrant. 
Many studies use the criterion of possession of a university-level qualification to denote ‘highly 
skilled’, to which others would also add ‘extensive experience in a given field’ (Iredale 2000: 
883), the type of occupation (professional, technical etc.), or even income level (Williams and 
Baláž 2005: 440). Some studies try to combine criteria (such as qualifications and occupation), 
or add in specific categories, such as students and entrepreneurs who may not (yet) be graduates, 
to create a composite class of ‘professionals and highly skilled’ (e.g. Mahroum 2000: 25). 
Necessarily pragmatic, our YMOBILITY consortium defines highly skilled migrants as those 
with tertiary-level degrees; students (undergraduates or postgraduates) are a separate category 
in the research design.  
 Choosing educational qualifications as the criterion for defining higher-skilled migrants 
is, however, not unproblematic. First, skills come in many types, some of which are not 
captured by formal qualifications. There are important ‘soft’ skills relating to communication, 
flexibility, sensibility to others’ views etc. Reflecting the ‘capabilities’ approach to human 
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development (Nussbaum 2011), we should therefore speak about the lifelong skills and 
competences of migrants. Skills and competences can be enhanced and valorised through 
migration, or the reverse may also happen; hence we witness migration as a process of both 
‘up-skilling’ and ‘de-skilling’ in different contexts. Furthermore, skills and competences can 
be developed in so-called low-skill work environments and later valorised in more prestigious 
occupations. This is shown, for example, in the case of Slovak au pairs working in the UK. 
Despite being employed well below their qualifications (most were university students or 
graduates), these migrants were able to acquire language and other social skills which proved 
useful upon return home to progress their studies and careers (Williams and Baláž 2005). 
 Second, skills are not ‘fixed’, universally valuable resources that individuals possess 
and can easily put to use wherever they go (Nowicka 2014). Numerous studies draw attention 
to the non-recognition of migrants’ qualifications or work experience (Bauder 2005; Erel 2010). 
This can happen in two ways: either the non-recognition of home-acquired skills and 
qualifications when migrants move abroad, or the non-recognition of qualifications and work 
experience earned abroad when migrants return to their home countries. Distinguishing 
between qualifications and skills, Csedő argues that skills are not simply owned by individuals 
but constantly negotiated between employers and prospective employees (2008: 807). 
Employers may be unfamiliar with and unable to assess a migrant’s qualifications and informal 
skills (Csedő 2008; Moroşanu 2016; Nowicka 2014). For their skills to be ‘recognised’, 
individuals also require the competence and confidence to communicate them in ways that 
resonate with relevant audiences and labour markets (Williams and Baláž 2005: 446).  
 Focusing on the common trend of ‘de-skilling’ amongst Polish graduates in the UK, 
Nowicka (2014) further emphasises the variable value of skills, depending on the sending and 
receiving labour-market contexts in which they are developed and put into practice. The Polish 
migrants she studied perceived the skills acquired in Poland as having little value in the UK, 
due to the apparent gap between the type of knowledge gained at university in Poland (general 
academic knowledge) and the more practical skills needed to access the UK labour market. 
However, although partly disadvantaged and working in mostly low-skilled jobs in the UK, 
these migrants could utilise their general competences in a different way, earning employers’ 
appreciation by showing a strong work ethic and the potential for learning new skills and thus 
moving to a better position in the labour market. Challenging the idea that skills are ‘fixed’ 
attributes that migrants can simply transfer abroad, Nowicka thus uses the term ‘migration 
skills’ to capture the ways in which migrants can re-define and validate their skills in specific 
labour-market sectors at destination, as opposed to the place of origin.  
 To conclude: although we define high-skilled largely on the basis of tertiary education, 
we seek to capture the diverse types of competence and expertise which migrants may possess 
and further develop in their countries of immigration. We remain sensitive to the complex 
nature of skills which can be acquired in different environments and have variable meaning 
and value, depending on where and how they are employed.  
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Youth transitions 
One of the key objectives of the YMOBILITY programme of research is to establish the extent 
to which young individuals consider international mobility to be a rational strategy for 
improving their lives and, in particular, to mediate three significant youth life-course transitions:  
 
 school or higher education to work; 
 unemployment to employment; and 
 youth to independent or ‘full’ adulthood, the latter stage being generally understood as 
implying partnership formation, having children and establishing a ‘home’. 
 
This broad sequence of youth transition to adulthood may follow the standard ‘Western’ model 
of school/education > work > marriage and house/flat > family and career but, increasingly, 
both in terms of empirical reality and the conceptualisation of youth/life transitions, there are 
alternative pathways. Rather than fixed stages, we can think of evolutions, ‘becomings’ (Worth 
2009), but also of ‘ruptures’, ‘reversals’, ‘discontinuities’, ‘interrupted’ and ‘repeat’ transitions 
etc. (Borlagdan 2015; Hörschelmann 2011). 
 Youth mobility is a far from homogenous phenomenon, and different pathways provide 
different opportunities depending on whether those concerned are students or workers, skilled 
or unskilled, male or female, and embedded in strong or weak social networks, including formal 
recruitment channels for going abroad. Whilst it remains true that the highest peak in the 
demographic migration profile coincides with the transition from education to work (King et 
al. 2006: 240), youth migration has increased and diversified in recent decades, especially since 
2000. There are now diverse migration and mobility pathways that range from student mobility 
within and beyond Europe, researcher mobility schemes, international placements and 
internships, to individual job-seeking migration and firm and agency recruitment, at all levels 
of the skills and experience hierarchy. 
 Within Europe, two factors have enhanced the pace and urgency of youth mobility in 
recent years. The post-2008 economic crisis, which has particularly affected the weaker, 
smaller, peripheral economies of the EU, has increased rates of (in some cases, already high) 
youth unemployment, pushing people to look abroad in order to become economically 
independent and develop their careers en route to achieving the transition to adult independence. 
Even without the crisis, the uncertainties of globalisation and labour-market flexibilisation 
have influenced young people’s ability to establish themselves as independent adults, form 
partnerships and become parents (Blossfield et al. 2012; Oppenheimer 2003). The second 
factor is the combined lubricating effect of institutional and technological developments: EU 
freedom-of-movement provisions and the transport-cost reductions of budget airlines and 
cheap coach travel. 
 We now examine the three youth transitions listed above and problematise each in turn. 
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Education into employment 
The school/university to work transition is the one which traditionally coincides with high 
spatial mobility, although this generalisation is usually made with reference to internal rather 
than international mobility. Relatively few people move abroad in their mid- or late teens 
immediately after finishing secondary school; rather the peak in international mobility comes 
in the later years of the early-mid 20s; following a spell in higher or further education and 
perhaps some years of work experience in the home country. Often it is the unsatisfactory 
nature of this work experience (low-paid, precarious, subject to bouts of unemployment etc.) 
which prompts the desire or need to move abroad.  
 But there are other mobilities and transitions which disturb this ‘classic’ study-to-
employment transition. These include combined study/work regimes, such as Erasmus-
sponsored international work placements and internships, au pair mobility, work-oriented ‘gap 
years’ between school and university, and the ‘intra-academic’ transition from student to paid 
researcher. Then there is the ‘reverse transition’ from work to study. In this latter case, these 
individuals may first work in their home countries in order to fund their studies abroad or may 
work abroad in order to fund their studies at home; others may move abroad in order to work 
initially and then switch to studying abroad; and yet others who, once abroad, combine work 
and part-time study (or full-time study with part-time work). 
 Du Bois-Reymond and López Blasco (2003) characterise these ‘misleading’ transitions, 
which deviate from the standard study-to-job norm, through a ‘yo-yo’ metaphor. ‘Yo-yo’ 
transitions are strongly linked to flexible labour-market relations and the ‘destandardisation’ 
of both work and education (Walther et al. 2006). These linked phenomena can be 
characterised in both a negative and a positive light. The negative interpretation emphasises 
the increasing precarity of the job market, especially (but not only) in weak economies and at 
lower skill levels. The more positive interpretation points to the creative way in which such yo-
yo or ‘side-stepping’ moves enable young people to maximise their opportunities at different 
points in time, experience a diversity of possible future trajectories, and build up a portfolio of 
varied skills, qualifications and competences (Lundahl and Olofsson 2014). 
 
 
Migration as a route from unemployment to employment 
Unemployed to employed is another classic transition which often coincides with geographical 
mobility, except that some categories of unemployed are highly immobile – their reluctance to 
move is related to a fear of the unknown and their embeddedness in family structures and socio-
cultural networks tied to the place of origin. Within this general employment-related mobility 
transition, there are many sub-types, including from casual and part-time employment to full-
time employment, from lower- to higher-paid work of a similar (or different) type, and from 
less- to more-skilled jobs. However, there are also work-related mobilties which combine 
‘upward’ with ‘reverse’ transitions. These usually occur when there are language barriers to be 
crossed and/or significant contrasts in income and life-chances between the countries of origin 
and of destination. Under such circumstances, young migrants may have to disregard their 
qualifications (e.g. as graduates) in order to take low-skilled work which is, nevertheless, much 
more highly paid than the much lower wages available in the home country, even for secure, 
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highly skilled jobs. Hence, we find, for example, trained teachers or medical assistants in 
Eastern Europe forsaking their steady but low-paid jobs at home in order to undertake much 
better-paid manual jobs in high-wage economies in Sweden, Germany or the UK. More 
examples of this ‘deskilling’ and ‘brain waste’ will be given in later in this paper. 
 
 
Youth to adulthood 
The above two transitions are part-components of the broader transition from youth to ‘full’ 
adulthood. Arnett (2004) argues that staged transitions from school to work and ‘emerging 
adulthood’ are standard across social contexts; a reflection of the robustness of the standard 
linear transition model. Roberts (2003) has likewise argued that young people in post-socialist 
countries demonstrate faithfulness to the conventional transitions paradigm – an interesting 
finding when set against the backdrop of individualisation and profound transformation in post-
socialist societies.  
 Nevertheless, as already noted, right across Europe (and beyond), new uncertainties, 
conjunctures and structural forces combine to challenge the standard youth-to-adulthood 
transition model. These forces include the uncertainties of globalisation, economic crisis 
(profound in some countries, less so in others), labour-market flexibilisation and, working on 
a somewhat different principle, the emergence of wider youth-oriented lifestyle models which 
prolong youthful identities and practices into later age groups – to 20s, 30s, 40s and beyond 
(Settersten and Ray 2010). 
Another set of contrasting influences derives from diverse family and community 
contexts. In Southern Europe, where family structures and cross-generational support 
mechanisms remain strong (although declining), young adults are supported by their parents 
until later ages than would be considered the norm in Northern Europe. Difficult access to the 
labour market, especially for graduates with degrees in non-vocational subjects, means that 
young men and women may be ‘sheltered’ and ‘subsidised’ by their parents, who provide them 
with board, lodging and financial support until such time (typically nowadays in their 30s) as 
they can finally acquire a decent job and settle down independently or with a partner. In other 
countries and amongst other classes, ‘adultification’ may start much earlier, due to family 
break-up or the emigration of one or both parents (Burton 2007). Yet another way in which a 
measure of independence may be thrust on young people is when they are sent to boarding 
school, either in the home country or abroad. In the UK, top boarding schools have many pupils 
from wealthy families in continental Europe (as well as Russia, China, Nigeria etc.) who have 
been placed in such schools as a springboard for accessing leading UK and international 
universities (Dunne et al. 2014).  
Above all, class and wealth inequalities, highly dependent on the places and countries 
where young people grow up, also play an important role in future mobility choices and life 
transitions towards adulthood (Ball et al. 2000; Macdonald 1998; Macdonald et al. 2005). In 
some of the intersections between class, youth, mobility trajectories and choice, mobility is 
almost pre-ordained; in others it is a precarious trajectory, subject to risk and uncertainty. 
Middle- and upper-class youth can enjoy international mobility as a ‘rite of passage’ and 
benefit from the enriching outcomes of yo-yo transitions between international study and work-
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placement opportunities. They can afford experimentation with identity roles, open-ended 
careers and relationships, and are often able to trade on the boosting effects of well-developed 
family contacts and the prestige of an education from a prestigious university (Findlay et al. 
2012). Working-class youth usually cannot afford to delay the transition to work and the 
establishment of the material base for a family (Silva 2013), or the migration of a young parent 
may be necessary in order to support children at home. For working-class students and migrants, 
there can be important ‘hidden costs’ in moving abroad, such as the loss of working-class social 
capital (Borlagdan 2015: 841).  
In sum, the challenges and risks that emerge from the diversification and blurring of 
youth transitions are different in the various countries, places and regions of Europe, and they 
also markedly differ according to class, educational status, family status and gender. In the next 
three sections of this review, we exemplify these generalisations with reference to three main 
groups: students, higher-skilled migrants, and lesser-skilled migrants.  
 
 
Mobile students 
The mainstream migration and mobility literatures have tended to overlook international 
student mobility. Open any of the main textbooks on migration (for instance, Boyle et al. 1998; 
Brettell and Hollifield 2015; Cohen 1995; Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Constant and Zimmermann 
2013) and you will find almost nothing on students-as-migrants (an exception is Samers 2010: 
5–6, 26–30, 79–80, 164–168). Much the same goes, even more surprisingly, for the texts on 
the mobilities paradigm (Adey 2010; Cresswell 2006; Urry 2007); surprising, since the general 
discourse speaks about mobile students and student mobility. Clearly, students moving across 
international borders to pursue studies in another country are not conventionally seen as 
‘migrants’; nor, indeed, do they see themselves as such. Ask them if they are migrants, and 
they will reply that no, they are international students, visiting or exchange students etc. 
Purposely or unwittingly, they distance themselves from migrants, who are constructed in their 
minds as people who move for work and who are more likely to be poor people or refugees. 
And yet, following the neutral, technical definition of international migration – according to 
Samers (2010: 9–10) ‘the act of moving across international boundaries from a country of 
origin to take up residence in a country of destination’ – usually subject to a minimum threshold 
of residence (such as six months or one year) – students qualify as migrants. 
 Within Europe, the labelling of travelling students as mobile people, rather than as 
migrants, is reinforced by EU terminology, which is resolutely about their mobility, not their 
migration. There is an implied, but rarely made explicit, distinction between intra-EU student 
movement as mobility, and long-distance student movement, for instance from China, Africa, 
the Middle East etc. into Europe to study and then perhaps stay on to work, which is seen as 
international student migration. Either way, international student mobility or international 
student migration, we can use the acronym ISM. 
 What this all means is that the literature on ISM has tended to develop outside the 
mainstream migration/mobilities studies literature. Only recently have papers on ISM started 
to appear in migration journals, and they still appear rather rarely. Instead the ISM literature is 
scattered in education journals and in journals from disciplines like sociology and geography. 
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On the other hand there has been a glut of recent books on ISM, many of them global rather 
than European in scope (see, for instance, Bilecen 2014; Brooks and Waters 2011; Byram and 
Dervin 2008; de Wit et al. 2008; Murphy-Lejeune 2002; Van Mol 2014). 
 
 
Typologies and geographies of internationally mobile students 
ISM is a phenomenon which is rather easily classifiable into different subtypes; more difficult, 
however, is to put a container around the phenomenon, as it merges into other forms of hybrid 
migration/mobility such as the student-worker, international internships and study-work 
placements, or the blurred boundary between study and research careers – in some countries 
and institutional contexts a PhD student is classed as a student, in others as a career-track 
member of the research staff. In what follows we paraphrase the literature review carried out 
by King et al. (2010: 7–9). 
 Probably the most fundamental difference is between what is generally termed credit 
mobility and degree or diploma mobility. In the former case the student studies abroad (or 
perhaps does a work placement) for a relatively short period, typically a semester or a year, 
and then returns back to his or her home university to complete the programme of study, 
bringing the ‘credit’ from the foreign study or placement with them to contribute to the overall 
final assessment of the programme. A further subdivision of credit mobility regards whether 
the period spent abroad is mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory mobility is often part of specific 
degree programmes such as foreign languages or international business studies; voluntary 
mobility is strongly encouraged – indeed it is regarded almost as a right in European 
universities – even if it is still taken up by a relatively small proportion of the total student 
population. In the case of diploma or degree mobility, the student moves abroad for the entire 
duration of the academic programme – Bachelor’s, Master’s or doctoral degree, or some other 
kind of higher education diploma. On the whole, within Europe, credit mobility is more 
common amongst undergraduate students, whereas degree mobility is more attractive to 
postgraduates. 
 Other typologies are hinted at above: namely the level of study, ranging from 
undergraduate (or even pre-university study) to doctoral; and the type of activity undertaken – 
study within a university setting, work placement or internship, or taking a job as a temporary 
language teacher or laboratory assistant within a framework of credit mobility. 
 Geography plays a differentiating role, too. Here the main distinction is between ISM 
within Europe (such as the long-running Erasmus scheme of student exchange mobility) and 
ISM beyond Europe, where the main outward flows are to the United States, and the main 
inward flows are from less-developed countries such as China, India and countries in Asia, 
Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. 
 The geography of student mobility within Europe has been shaped by the twin tracks 
of the Erasmus programme and the Bologna process. The Erasmus scheme started in 1987 and 
was promoted to facilitate student exchanges between pairs and networks of countries and 
universities. The Bologna process, launched in 1999, was designed to create a European area 
of higher education based on harmonised systems and structures of academic study with mutual 
recognisability. ‘Erasmus’ is in many ways a unique programme in that people are paid to be 
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mobile, receiving a top-up grant (albeit modest, around 250 euros per month) and supported 
by a network of protocols and administrative structures (Recchi 2015: 41–43). According to 
Recchi (2015: 71), the Erasmus scheme has been ‘the single most important EU activity to 
spread Europeanness into everyday life’. Approximately 3 million students have benefited 
since the scheme’s inception. Yet the scheme has consistently failed to achieve its targeted 
numbers over its several decades of operation, and participation rates have been highly uneven 
across its constituent members (now the EU28 plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey). 
 Commenting on the uneven geography of Erasmus flows and exchanges, Brooks and 
Waters (2011: 76–81), de Wit (2008) and King (2003) make the following observations. There 
are long-established net outflows from the less wealthy southern EU countries (Portugal, Spain, 
Italy and Greece) to the wealthier northern partners (especially the UK and Ireland, but also 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden). The UK and Ireland – arguably 
because of their attractiveness as English-language destinations and also because of the 
perceived high quality of the educational experience – are unusual in the matrix of flows 
because of the imbalance between inflows and outflows (the former roughly twice the latter). 
However, there are important changes over time, such as the rise of Spain as a favoured 
destination for North European Erasmus students, and the marked imbalance in flows from the 
Eastern EU countries – all net ‘exporters’ of Erasmus students. The highest net exporters (ratio 
of out- to in-movers) are Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania and Latvia (Brooks and Waters 2011: 
80; de Wit 2008: 175).  
 Outside of Erasmus, rather little is known about degree-mobile students who move 
within Europe: the statistics are patchy and the evidence partly anecdotal. Part of the statistical 
problem is how degree-mobile students are defined – by their ‘foreign’ citizenship, birthplace, 
habitual residence or country of prior residence. Erasmus-type exchange students are 
supposedly excluded, but this may not always be the case. In de Wit’s (2008) analysis of 
UNESCO, OECD and EURODATA statistics for the early-mid 2000s, several trends emerge. 
The key factors (push and pull) shaping the observed patterns include language, academic 
reputation of university systems, cost of living and fees. Hence students move within language-
similar countries – Germany, Austria and Switzerland; France, Belgium and Switzerland; the 
UK and Ireland etc. On average, European countries see around 2–3 per cent of their students 
engaged in outbound mobility – a share which has been relatively stable over time (Brooks and 
Waters 2011: 77; de Wit 2008: 185). For smaller countries, such as Cyprus and Luxembourg 
(but not Malta), the share is more than 50 per cent. The vast majority of degree-mobile students 
from Central and Eastern Europe study in Western Europe, in particular in Germany; 20 per 
cent stay within the Central-Eastern region.  
 Some recent flows – quantitatively modest in the grand scheme of things – have been 
triggered to the few universities in continental Europe (notably in the Netherlands and Sweden) 
which teach degrees through the medium of English and which have lower fees than, for 
example, parts of the UK, where fees for most courses were recently raised from £3000 to 
£9000 per year. At the postgraduate level, there has been a rapid expansion in Master’s-level 
programmes taught in English, thereby creating clusters of international students in certain 
university cities. Likewise, increasing numbers of PhD theses are written, and research training 
and seminars given, in English. Hence there is a correlation between the ‘Europeanisation’ of 
university programmes and the expanding use of the globally hegemonic language of English. 
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Theorising international student mobility 
Attempts to theorise international student migration/mobility have been made by, amongst 
others, Brooks and Waters (2011: 10–18), Findlay (2011), Findlay et al. (2012), King and 
Findlay (2012) and Raghuram (2013). Following these writers, we nominate four main 
theoretical domains: 
 
 ISM as part of highly skilled migration; 
 ISM as both a product of, and a key mechanism underpinning, the internationalisation and 
globalisation of higher education; 
 ISM as part of global youth mobility cultures; and 
 the importance of a class analysis of ISM and its relationship to social inequality. 
 
We take each of these theoretical perspectives in turn. 
 Looking at ISM as a form of highly skilled migration reinforces the key transition noted 
earlier from higher education to a high-skilled, professional job. However, there is an argument 
that students are not ‘yet’ highly skilled since they have not yet entered the labour market, 
although there may be exceptions to this in the cases of mature students or students on sandwich 
courses which combine paid work and study.  
 On a global scale, Australia and Canada have been the most active in the strategy of 
attracting foreign students as a way of enriching the supply of highly qualified human capital 
into the domestic labour markets. This is a macro-economic policy which is pursued by some 
European countries, where it seems to work particularly at the postgraduate level for scientists, 
academic researchers and teachers. Rights to stay on after graduation are guaranteed for EU 
nationals, but the pattern is uneven for graduating third-country nationals. A potential flipside 
is the danger of a form of ‘brain drain’ from the smaller peripheral countries of Europe if their 
‘brightest and best’ students are studying abroad, and not returning, in large numbers. The 
transition from higher education to employment is reviewed in more detail in the next 
subsection. 
 Second, we see ISM as reciprocally linked with the globalisation of higher education 
– it is both a product of globalisation and an underlying mechanism of that very process. Higher 
education, both globally and within the European setting, has become a multi-billion-dollar 
business with clear market, and increasingly marketised, features. Supply and demand are 
likewise recursively related. Higher education products and services (university degrees or the 
overall ‘student experience’) are supplied to ‘customers’ (students) who ‘demand’ them and 
are willing to pay a certain price. In the reverse relationship, the supply of students, particularly 
the best international students, is a scarce resource demanded, competed for and consumed by 
the increasingly stratified global higher education system. Hence the notion of ‘world-class 
universities’ (Findlay et al. 2012) emerges as a powerful symbol of this progressively 
globalised, neoliberal market for higher education. Alongside this hierarchisation of 
universities globally, another process sees them standardise, and internationalise, their 
curricula, thereby making them more internationally marketable and less shaped by national 
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perspectives and examples, especially in the humanities and social sciences (Brooks and 
Waters 2011: 137).  
 The third conceptual frame for ISM considers it as part of youth mobility cultures, 
whereby travelling, living and studying abroad is seen as a life-stage rite of passage, and 
therefore more of an ‘act of consumption’ than an economic strategy aimed at improving an 
individual’s human capital and, thus, income and career prospects. The key objective is not so 
much academic achievement in and of itself (although it is important not to ‘fail’), but the 
cultural experience of living in another country, with its different climate, scenery, historical 
heritage, recreational opportunities, food and music traditions, and opportunities for new cross-
national social encounters. Following Bourdieu’s well-known essay on the ‘forms of capital’ 
(1986), Murphy-Lejeune (2002) proposes the appealing term ‘mobility capital’ as accruing to 
the mobile student – a form of capital which enriches the individual’s life experience and which 
can perhaps also be parlayed into an improved CV and job credentials. Thus the mobile and 
interculturally experienced student distinguishes him/herself from the routine modernities of a 
static student lifeworld by celebrating the international stage on which their study history and 
personal, individualised biography have been built (cf. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002).  
 This third perspective tends to construct internationally mobile students as an elite 
category, which leads to the fourth framing – the importance of class and inequality in analyses 
of ISM. Several studies have shown that ISM acts as a means to reproduce social-class 
distinctions and elite formation. For example, the Euro Student 2000 report found convincing 
evidence that ‘students from low-income families make substantially less use of opportunities 
for studying abroad than do those from families with higher income’ (Schnitzer and Zempel-
Gino 2002: 115). In this analytical frame, we therefore see a symbiosis between social divisions 
and educational structures, with a distinguishing role for ISM, creating an elite within an elite. 
In the European context, the effect is twofold: to create and maintain what Sklair (2001) calls 
‘the transnational capitalist class’, and to give birth to an EU-mobile group of multilingual 
students (‘Eurostars’ à la Favell 2008) who are favourable to the ‘EU-project’ and who became 
ideal employees in EU institutions (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003). 
 The strength of class divisions and their fluidity over time obviously vary in Europe 
from one country to another. For students, parental occupation and income constitute one 
structuring variable, but how this is passed on to the next generation varies according to the 
nature of the education system, including access routes from school to university. Countries 
where the state-provided education system is of uniformly high quality, and caters for all or 
virtually all of a country’s pupils, have the best chance of smoothing out the inherited effects 
of parental status and income. However, in other countries such as the UK, the private 
educational system, whose bastion is the elite sector of the perversely named ‘public schools’, 
has a key role to play in reproducing entrenched class divisions. In two papers drawn from the 
same project, Dunne et al. (2014) and King et al. (2011) show how, for UK applicants for 
higher education and for studying abroad, there are powerful social-class filters activated 
through this binary distinction between state and fee-paying schools. Pupils from the latter are 
both more likely to apply to and get into the ‘best’ UK universities (the so-called ‘Russell 
group’) and are more likely to apply to study at elite universities abroad such as the ‘Ivy League’ 
in the US or top universities in continental Europe.  
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ISM and youth mobility transitions 
There are multiple transitions involved in the stage of life in which education is the dominant 
activity: transitions both within education and between education and employment. All types 
of study-to-study or study-to-work transition may or may not coincide with spatial mobility, 
and that mobility can be either within a country or international. The main types are as follows: 
 
 school to university (stay-at-home, internal mobility or international move); 
 undergraduate to postgraduate study (Bachelor’s to Master’s, Master’s to doctorate; again 
stay put or migrate internally or internationally); 
 university to employment (stay put, move internally, return to home country, or move on 
to a third country). 
 
Within the third category, above, some students and postgraduates will transition to 
employment within the academic world, to a postdoc, research assistant or lecturing post, 
which again may well involve international mobility, either to another, new country or, if the 
student has studied or researched abroad, back to the country of origin. There is now a growing 
literature on these academic mobilities which examines the interactions between the 
phenomenon of international mobility on the one hand and the various, rather blurred, 
evolutionary transitions along the academic staircase from student to researcher to lecturer (see, 
for example, Ackers and Gill 2008; Amelina 2013; Byram and Dervin 2008; Jöns 2009; Larner 
2015; Pásztor 2015). 
 Selected insights from this literature are as follows. First, there are powerful echoes of 
the well-known debates on brain drain, brain return and brain circulation, especially when the 
‘brains’ originate from peripheral, weaker economies in the Southern and Eastern EU. Bulgaria 
is a country where there has been a large-scale brain drain to the ‘West’ and where the pool of 
scientific expertise has been significantly depleted. Italy, albeit a much richer country, also 
voices concerns about brain drain. Here, problems with the funding of universities and the non-
transparent (some would say highly personalistic, even corrupt) system for academic 
appointments and career progression have a dual effect which stimulates many academics and 
research students to emigrate, and which deters ‘outsiders’ from applying for university posts. 
As a result, Italy has one of the least diverse university staff populations in Europe (Ackers and 
Gill 2008: 17). Even returning Italian academics, who have PhDs or other research experience 
from abroad, are viewed with a mixture of jealousy and suspicion, and blocked from 
appointments to posts for which they are highly qualified, in favour of ‘local’ candidates who 
are less well qualified but have ‘connections’ (Ackers and Gill 2008: 17). 
 Amelina (2013) describes the experience of Ukrainian scientists in Germany, where the 
outcome is rather different. In the Ukraine, foreign academic experience such as a PhD, a 
visiting fellowship or an appointment in a West European university carries great prestige 
whereas, in Germany, these ‘Eastern’ scientists are made to feel like second-class academic 
citizens and expected to work ‘twice as hard’ as their German colleagues (2013: 143). 
Ukrainian (and presumably other ‘Eastern’) scholars in Germany develop an ambiguous self-
narrative as an ‘exploited elite’. They are aware of their exploitation but they accept it, partly 
out of pride that they can indeed work ‘twice as hard’ and partly because of the counter-
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balancing prestige that they enjoy in their home country, where they often hold visiting 
appointments and are treated as heroes. 
 Returning now to the main transitions idea associated with third-level study abroad – 
namely that it has ‘value’ which can be materialised in the form of higher earnings and a more 
satisfying career – there is a general orthodoxy that this is indeed the case, but also some 
counter-evidence which not so much contradicts but nuances the orthodox view and poses some 
questions about its in-built assumptions. 
 First, then, the conventional view, in support of which there is a fair amount of research 
evidence, both statistical and qualitative. The quantitative evidence comes from a variety of 
sources, of which we cite just a couple here. In one of the earliest papers which tried to quantify 
the ‘pay-offs’ of study abroad, King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003) compared a sample of graduates 
who had taken an undergraduate year abroad (n=261) with a control sample (n=106) of those 
who had not. The data were collected during 2000–2001 from graduates of the University of 
Sussex who had graduated during 1987–2000. The results are revealing. Those who had been 
on a year abroad were:  
 
 more likely to have pursued postgraduate study (69 per cent vs 46 per cent for the ‘non-
mobile’ sample); 
 more likely to be in employment related to the degree that they took (45 vs 30 per cent); 
 more likely to be employed as a professional, manager, director or teacher (56 vs 43 per 
cent); 
 more likely to have an annual income of at least £20,000 (52 vs 33 per cent); 
 more likely to have lived abroad at some stage since graduation (43 vs 26 per cent); and 
 more likely to be currently living abroad (20 vs 7 per cent). 
 
These survey data indicate not only that year-abroad graduates do better in career and income 
terms, but also that they are more likely to carry over their university experience of international 
mobility to their post-graduation lives. 
 There is, however, a potential logical flaw which the authors acknowledge (King and 
Ruiz-Gelices 2003: 247) and which is further commented on by Recchi (2015: 82–83). This is 
the fallacy of the self-fulfilling prophecy: namely that, in spite of the fact that the authors 
controlled for academic performance at entry to university and for parental socio-economic 
class, nevertheless there is the possibility that those who choose degree courses with a period 
of study built in were already, by that very choice, a self-selected group who were more 
ambitious, adventurous and curious about languages and cultures different from their own. 
 If the King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003) samples were rather small and drawn from one 
university only, subsequent analyses carried out for and by the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (see HEFCE 2004: 81–90; HEFCE 2009; both summarised in King et al. 
2010: 28–31) provide remarkably similar results based on the entire national populations of 
‘returned’ Erasmus students and of all students in higher education in England. These studies 
show that, compared to the total national student body, returned Erasmus students after 
graduation are: 
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 disproportionately female (69 vs 55 per cent); 
 less likely to be ‘ethnically non-white’ (8 vs 16 per cent); 
 more likely to be from the top three parental socio-occupational classes (83 vs 76 per cent); 
 more likely to get ‘first-class’ degrees (15 vs 11 per cent) and more likely to get ‘good 
degrees’ (first plus upper-second-class, 73 vs 61 per cent); and 
 more likely to be earning £20,000 per year one year after graduation (29 vs 17 per cent). 
 
Once again, however, we should be cautious about attributing these positive outcomes purely 
to the ‘Erasmus effect’, since there is an inbuilt bias towards high academic and economic 
performance deriving from the fact that, at the national aggregate scale, Erasmus students enter 
university with significantly higher school-leaving grades. Specifically, whilst 49 per cent of 
Erasmus students have more than 360 tariff points from A-level and equivalent qualifications, 
for non-mobile students the share is only 29 per cent (King et al. 2010: 30).  
 Qualitative evidence on the link between international study and an advantageous 
transition into employment largely comes from interview material with students/graduates who 
are about to go, or have passed, through that study-to-work transition. Here there is a rather 
unanimous collective discourse that international exposure as a student, particularly if the 
experience is at a ‘world-class’ university (Findlay et al. 2012), will yield a career advantage, 
especially if the student aspires to an ‘international’ career. This is a collective view sustained 
not only by mobile students but also by ‘mobility managers’ – the international and study-
abroad officers in the universities heavily involved in promoting ISM – and by the publications 
and websites of the Erasmus offices in Brussels and elsewhere (see the review in King et al. 
2010: 34–38). ISM is ‘good’, the chorus says, because it enhances students’ employability in 
an increasingly competitive graduate labour market, especially one which becomes inevitably 
more globalised, and because, at a macro-European level, it enhances the global 
competitiveness of European businesses and corporations. 
 The missing link in this discussion is the view of the employers. Varghese (2008: 24) 
asserts that the advantages of studying abroad, in terms of employment and prestige, are higher 
in developing countries than in developed ones. Evidence for employers’ views in Europe is 
limited to small-scale surveys. Fielden et al. (2007: 14) surveyed ‘more than 20’ large 
companies in the UK and found that ‘around 60 per cent of the country’s top employers indicate 
that experience of international study enhances employability’. They commented that studying 
abroad makes an applicant well-rounded in terms of skills, experience and personal 
development. The remainder of this small survey indicated that they recruited graduates on the 
basis of the individuals’ strengths rather than paying any special attention to international study 
experience. Secondly, the broader EU VALERA study (VALue of ERAsmus) on the 
professional value of the Erasmus experience found that, in general, employers ‘consider the 
internationally experienced graduates superior to other graduates as far as many competences 
are concerned, and many of them believe that formerly mobile students will be more successful 
in their long-term careers’ (Bracht et al. 2006: xxiii). Here again, however, we must be cautious 
because of the small size of the employer respondent group and low response rate. The much 
larger student response dataset in the VALERA study endorsed the value of Erasmus but found 
that perceptions of its value declined in successive rounds of the survey between the early 
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1990s and the mid-2000s, possibly because of the increasing numbers of Erasmus-experienced 
graduates and hence their decreasing competitiveness and advantage over time (Bracht et al. 
2006: xxiii).  
More critical perspectives on the ‘employability’ argument of international study come 
mainly from qualitative studies which go beyond and behind simple interview or questionnaire 
survey data, and pose questions which demand a different perspective to illuminate the wider 
process of student-to-employment career trajectories. One key point is that the very nature of 
these trajectories varies from one national context to another in Europe. Lindberg (2009) 
compares student and early career mobility patterns in four countries – Finland, Germany, Italy 
and the UK – where ‘mobility’ means both vertical (career) and horizontal (spatial) mobility, 
the latter referring to movement between universities and study programmes mainly within the 
respective countries. Different national patterns emerge. In Finland and Germany there is a 
high level of student mobility at the basic degree level followed by a low level of career 
mobility after graduation. In the UK the opposite occurs: low-level student mobility but high 
career mobility afterwards. In Italy, students demonstrate prolonged and problematic 
transitions, with little mobility either as students or at the early career stage. 
 Another strand of critique challenges the widespread notion of studying abroad as a 
highly socially selective process available only to an elite class of students who strategise their 
choice to study internationally as part of individualistic rational-choice careerist ambitions. 
Pásztor’s (2015) study of international doctoral students at a prominent British university found 
other, supply-side factors to be important, including access to networks of academic 
researchers and organised schemes of funding at the international, national and university 
levels. Pásztor also argues that, at least at the doctoral level, access to international study is 
socially broader and governed by the ‘exceptional ability’ of individuals to win scholarships 
and bursaries, thereby questioning the notion of international students as a ‘migratory elite’ 
(2015: 839).  
 The main line of critique against an individualist reading of ISM, especially at the 
postgraduate level, is that this optic ignores the broader structural, family and life-course 
settings, and in particular the role of family relationships and responsibilities. Carlson (2013) 
stresses that the ‘why’ of student mobility decisions should be combined with the ‘how’ of 
their migration processes, and set within student biographies. He argues for a processual 
understanding of the personal dynamics of ISM, recognising that students, like other migrants, 
alter their ideas about migration and longer-term life-plans throughout their periods of study 
abroad or back home.  
 Several authors (Ackers and Gill 2008; Geddie 2013; Mosneaga and Winther 2013) 
focus on the family and partnership aspects of ISM. This emphasis is especially relevant for 
students and researchers at doctoral and postdoctoral levels, where this phase of advanced study 
and research often coincides with stable partnerships, marriage and the birth of children. Hence 
the simplistic focus on the individualistic, disembedded, almost disembodied, transition from 
education to employment needs to take on board a whole range of constraining or enabling 
factors such as partner’s career and nationality (and hence rights to citizenship and to work), 
the needs of children, regimes of childcare and maternity/paternity leave, and the wider family 
context, including the care needs of elderly parents. Referring to Marie Curie mobility, Ackers 
and Gill (2008: 91) write: ‘Having a partner affects the way people think about moving in a 
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number of ways: it influences decisions about whether to move at all or to move again 
(including return); where to move to; and for how long to stay’ (emphases in the original). A 
similar range of effects is brought about by the presence of children in the family, and it goes 
without saying that gender enters crucially into joint negotiations in decisions about academic 
mobility, as is clear throughout Ackers and Gill’s study. 
 
 
Towards a Europeanisation of identity? 
A key question for all migrants who move within or enter the ‘space’ of Europe concerns their 
changes of identity, and specifically whether they take on some kind of ‘European’ identity 
alongside, or replacing, their ‘national’ identity. This by no means exhausts the range of 
identity outcomes which can hypothetically result through mobility – we should also 
acknowledge the national identity of the country that students move to, as well as broader, more 
‘global’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ identities that might be expressed, on their own or in combination 
with other levels and layers of identification. 
 The possible formation of a ‘European identity’ was one of the questions of the 
aforementioned King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003) study on the year-abroad experiences of 
Erasmus students compared with non-mobile students. Questions which were asked as part of 
this University of Sussex study related to knowledge about and interest in EU affairs, attitudes 
towards membership of the EU, and various kinds of European, national and ‘other’ identity. 
Summarising the results, year-abroad graduates compared to non-mobile graduates were (in 
their own eyes): 
 
 more likely to be well-informed about the EU (50 per cent vs 39 per cent); 
 more likely to be interested in EU affairs (62 vs 54 per cent); 
 more likely to see the UK’s membership of the EU as a ‘good thing’ (87 vs 72 per cent); 
and  
 more likely to be unhappy about the break-up of the EU (64 vs 57 per cent).  
 
Regarding identification, perhaps due to the variety of combinations (European only, national 
only, European first then national, national first then European, ‘other’ etc.), there were no 
significant differences because of the problem of small numbers in each cell. 
 What is equally interesting is the difference between the various nationalities of mobile 
students. If UK students, who have low rates of both Erasmus and outward degree mobility 
compared to other European nationalities, can therefore be classed as ‘reluctant Europeans’ 
(Findlay et al. 2006), other nationalities express more positive, pan-European, identifications. 
Van Mol’s (2013, 2014) detailed comparative analyses, based on large-N questionnaire surveys 
and smaller-N interviews and focus groups, showed that a pro-active move towards a sense of 
shared ‘Europeanness’ was evident for most of the nationalities he surveyed (Austrians, 
Belgians, Italians, Poles) but less so for the ‘Eurosceptic’ Norwegians and British. Of course, 
there are different geopolitical histories lying behind these differential attachments to 
Europeanness. Belgium and Italy were participants from the very beginning of European 
‘unification’; Austria was not a founder-member but is by now a long-term member and has a 
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sense of Europeanness by virtue of geography – bordering many countries, both ‘east’ and 
‘west’; the recent accession of Poland to the EU has created an ‘omnipresence’ of Europe which 
strongly influences feelings of European identity among its mobile students; whilst Norway is 
a ‘different place’ in Europe, more attuned to a Nordic or Scandinavian identity; and the UK, 
tongue-in-cheek, is ‘an island between Europe and the United States’. 
 Other research, more ethnographic in nature, documents the means of interaction of 
Erasmus and other mobile students who move within Europe. Key here is their friendship and 
socialisation patterns (Bilecen 2014; Tsoukalas 2008). Studies reviewed by Brooks and Waters 
(2011: 14–16) indicate that, often, mobile students do not intensively socialise with host-
country students; rather, they ‘stick to their own’ or they mix mainly with other international 
students, often using the medium of English as the common language. For Murphy-Lejeune 
(2002), Erasmus students are the ‘new strangers’. In this author’s rich ethnography, still 
virtually unique of its type, Murphy-Lejeune concludes that ‘the lived experience of strangers 
arriving in a new culture’ results in ‘a special blend of distance and proximity which puts to 
the test the boundaries between self and other’ (2002: 229). She summarises the various stages 
that the ‘typical’ exchange student goes through (2002: 229–230): 
 
 expectations and anticipations before the move takes place; 
 cognitive shock on arrival, when students are thrown into direct contact with ‘otherness’, 
much of which is occasioned by being taught, learning and socialising in another language; 
 adaptation and social construction, when students start, and continue, to accommodate to 
the ‘new space’ of learning, everyday life, and building new friendships; 
 and at the end, a time of assessment of the value and meaning of the whole experience. 
 
Murphy-Lejeune’s main research finding is that practically everything in the European 
exchange-student experience, even the negative episodes, is assessed as enriching, positive, 
beneficial and character-building – unlike other migrants in other migratory contexts where the 
costs, personal and financial, may outweigh the benefits (2002: 230).  
 
 
High-skilled intra-European migrants 
Official statistics indicate that a considerable share of intra-EU migrants are highly skilled – 
bearing in mind our earlier discussion about the problematic definition of this category. 
According to Castro-Martín and Cortina (2015: 113), the typical European citizen who has 
lived in another member-state is young, male, and highly educated. Almost half of the movers 
from ‘old’ EU member-states (49 per cent) are known to be graduates; the proportion from the 
‘new’ EU member-states is smaller but still significant – 22 per cent for A8 countries, 14 per 
cent for A2 countries (see Recchi 2015: 58). 
 Many studies concerned with intra-European migration focus on the legal framework 
and policies framing cross-border mobility (Recchi 2015; Recchi and Favell 2009). By contrast, 
the experiences of the actual movers, particularly in terms of integration (cf. Gilmartin and 
Migge 2015) remain comparatively less understood – although the landmark study by Favell 
(2008) on the ‘Eurostar’ generation is an exception. Existing studies of the high-skilled migrant 
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category are quite diverse in their empirical focus, thematic concerns and theoretical 
approaches. In this section, we seek to extract some of the key themes and findings emerging 
from this literature. We look at the different types of high-skilled European migrants and their 
motivations to engage in cross-border mobility, their labour-market trajectories, the social 
aspects of integration and identity, and their orientation towards settlement or return.  
 
 
Diverse types and motivations 
The literature on high-skilled European migrants is rather fragmented, and informed by a 
variety of theoretical perspectives, depending on the themes and migrant category under study. 
Many studies tend to focus on the experiences of a single national-origin group in one place or 
country of destination, often working in a specific occupational sector. Examples include Irish 
teachers in the UK (Ryan 2015), French professionals working in London’s business and 
finance sectors (Mulholland and Ryan 2014; Ryan and Mulholland 2014a, 2014b), high-skilled 
British migrants in Paris (Scott 2006, 2007), and German finance managers in London (Meier 
2015). 
 There are some exceptions – studies which take a broader and more comparative 
perspective, either of the same nationality group in different destinations, or different national 
groups in the same destination. For example, Koikkalainen (2013) studied high-skilled Finns 
across Europe, and Ralph (2015) looked at Irish professional ‘Euro-commuters’ in different 
European cities. For studies which take the opposite comparative angle of mixed samples in a 
single destination, see Csedő (2008) on Hungarians and Romanians in London, Kennedy (2010) 
on EU graduates in Manchester, and two papers by King et al. (2014, 2015) on the ‘lure of 
London’ for, respectively, German, Italian and Latvian graduate migrants, and young migrants 
from the Baltic states. Broader in its geographical scope (although limited to the EU15 
member-states), and more imaginative in its epistemological approach, is Favell’s (2008) study 
of young graduate ‘Eurostars’ in London, Amsterdam and Brussels, typical ‘Eurocities’. 
 To some extent, Favell’s ‘Eurostar’ label gives a potentially mistaken impression of the 
young, mobile graduates he is writing about. Yet, as the author notes, these are not so much 
the archetypical elites who populate EU institutions and corresponding social circles (Favell 
2003). Rather, the Eurostars more resemble the ‘middling’ migrants of Conradson and Latham 
(2005). Middling migrants do generally come from well-educated, middle-class backgrounds, 
but also include ‘high achievers from modest backgrounds’, such as first-generation university 
graduates.  
 Although most research on the ‘middling transnational’ and ‘Eurostar’ types focuses 
on citizens of the ‘old’ EU member-states, especially those in Northern Europe, this has started 
to change with studies of post-accession East European professionals, whom Csedő (2008) 
calls the ‘new Eurostars’ (cf. also White 2016). The challenge for these new ‘Eastern’ Eurostars 
is to find employment commensurate with their qualifications. A common trend is that of 
downward occupational mobility with migration (Nowicka 2014; Trevena 2013) or retreat into 
self-employment (Vershinina et al. 2011). This reflects a common distinction in the literature 
on intra-European mobility between ‘free movers’, typically from the old member-states, and 
‘workers’ from the new member-states, due to the concentration of the latter in lower-skilled 
 
 
27 
 
jobs irrespective of their educational qualifications (Krings et al. 2013). Nevertheless, as 
Krings et al. show in their study of Polish migrants in Ireland, many of the participants in their 
study problematise the ‘professional’/‘worker’ divide; they are closer to the ‘middling’ migrant 
profile. Young, educated Polish migrants in Ireland ‘are part of a new generation of mobile 
Europeans for whom the move abroad is not only work-related but also involves lifestyle 
choices as part of a broader aspiration for self-development’ (Krings et al. 2013: 87). 
Reviewing the broader literature on Polish migration within a comparative European context, 
White (2016) similarly emphasises that the growing visibility of young, ambitious, well-
educated migrants, free from family obligations and without well-defined plans, increasingly 
matches the ‘Eurostar’ ideal-type. 
In between the ‘old’ northern member-states and the ‘new’ eastern ones lies an 
intermediate group along the EU’s southern flank (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece), plus 
Ireland. These are countries which turned themselves from emigration to immigration countries 
over the time-span from the 1950s–1970s (emigration) to the 1990s–2000s (immigration) but 
which now reappear, post-2008, as new countries of emigration, especially of young 
unemployed graduates (see, amongst others, Bygnes 2015; Cairns 2012; Conti and King 2015; 
Labrianidis and Vogiatzis 2013; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014). Once again, we observe a 
range of employment trajectory outcomes. Some are able to materialise their good academic 
and vocational qualifications and prior work experience into good jobs abroad, especially if 
they are fluent in the requisite languages. Others, however, are constrained to take lower-level 
jobs, for instance in restaurants and other service-sector employment. This may be a temporary 
phase until they acquire better language skills and other competences that enable them to move 
up the occupational ladder. 
 Studies that focus on high-skilled European migrants underscore the diversity of 
motivations underpinning their migration decision. Economic factors such as higher salaries 
and better employment opportunities are often important but, in many cases, they do not seem 
to play the sole or even the primary role. The search for adventure, new experiences, learning 
a new language, escaping the restrictive norms of the home society, self-development, lifestyle 
considerations or romantic relationships are often invoked to justify the decision to move 
abroad, alongside opportunities for career and skills development (for an overview of these 
various factors see Recchi and Favell 2009). 
 Younger movers are particularly likely to emphasise non-economic considerations, 
sometimes to the detriment of economic gains. For instance, for Germans in London, factors 
relating to living in a vibrant, culturally rich, global city often prevailed over income or career-
related factors, which were put ‘on hold’ pending an anticipated return after a couple of or a 
few years (King et al. 2014). German graduates were willing to ‘mark time’ in their careers, or 
even trade down to a more mundane office job, in order to enjoy their ‘time out’ or ‘career 
break’ in London (King et al. 2014: 10–11). Likewise, cultural reasons seem to be important 
amongst British migrants in Paris (Scott 2006) or amongst highly educated migrants in Berlin 
(Verwiebe 2014). In their study on intra-EU migrants in Ireland, Gilmartin and Migge (2015) 
also found that the majority moved for social or cultural reasons related to the acquisition of 
language skills, studying and gaining ‘new experiences’ in the workplace and in wider life.  
 Despite the inherent complexity of migration motivations, economic factors remain 
important, especially for migrants from the ‘new’ EU member-states (Nowicka 2014; 
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Szewczyk 2015), or post-2008 migrants from ‘older’ member-states such as Spain, Italy and 
Greece (Bygnes 2015; Conti and King 2015; Labrianidis and Vogiatzis 2013; Triandafyllidou 
and Gropas 2014). These migrants consistently express concerns about the limited career 
opportunities available in their home societies but also highlight the broader structural 
problems that prevent young people from accessing suitable (graduate-level) employment there 
and becoming independent from family support. Many of these themes are echoed in Bygnes’ 
(2015) research on Spanish high-skilled migrants in Norway, where the main stress is on the 
societal conditions that compel them to migrate. Spanish graduates interviewed by Bygnes 
expressed a rather profound sense of insecurity and disillusionment about their home society, 
which led them to move abroad. Bygnes uses the trope of anomie to denote the stream of 
complaints about the ‘state of Spanish society’ and its alleged corruption, growing social 
inequality and other flaws. These migrants are, however, reluctant to portray themselves as 
‘crisis migrants’ as they see this as a sign of desperation and stigmatisation from which they 
wish to distance themselves. Similar results are found by Conti and King (2015; also King et 
al. 2014: 17–18) for Italian graduates in London, who explained their move away from Italy 
less in terms of reaction to the country’s economic crisis and more in terms of a deep structural 
crisis of youth and graduate unemployment in a society and labour market dominated by 
hierarchical seniority and a culture of ‘connections’ and ‘favours’. 
 In a study of Polish graduates moving to the UK after 2004, Szewczyk (2015) also 
moves beyond purely economic reasons for migration, this time underscoring the importance 
of the historical political context and the socio-economic changes experienced by youth 
growing up in post-socialist states, which shape their sense of generational belonging and 
subsequent migration decisions. These young graduates are well aware of the ‘new space of 
opportunities’ (Morokvasic 2004) emerging after the collapse of communism and subsequent 
accession to the EU, and hence experience migration as another major change in their lives. 
 Lastly, the literature on scientific and academic mobility adds a specific dimension to 
motivations for engaging in cross-border mobility by noting that, for academics and researchers, 
mobility may be the ‘norm’ (Guth and Gill 2008: 829; Morano-Foadi 2005: 144). In this case, 
researchers move because of the nature of their study-projects, seeking supportive work 
environments and laboratories where their research can flourish and their careers advance.  
 
 
Labour market status and employment trajectories 
Within the ideology of neoliberalism, classically trained economists argue strongly for the ‘free 
mobility’ of labour – ‘the ultimate economic resource’ – in order to achieve the best allocation 
of resources and hence, they claim, to maximise aggregate economic welfare (see Simon 1981 
for the foundational study; Zimmermann 2014 for a useful recent summary). ‘The key to it all’, 
opines Zimmermann (2014: 6), ‘is to focus on the migration of skilled people’. Zimmermann 
goes on to argue that intra-European skilled migration not only fosters economic efficiency, 
but also creates additional jobs for the unskilled and the ‘differently skilled’ (2014: 6). His 
view, stated with a typical economist’s disregard for the human, emotional and embodied 
consequences of what amounts to a virtual forced migration, is that the recent economic crisis 
in Greece, Portugal and Spain was a ‘blessing in disguise’, since there is a strong incentive for 
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the skilled unemployed in these countries to move to booming employment centres in Germany 
and the UK, where their talents can be better utilised (2014: 10). 
 All this is fine in theory and, for some, in practice too. But, as Zimmermann himself 
acknowledges (2014: 6–7), there are barriers which make this smooth mobility and efficient 
deployment of skilled labour more difficult to achieve in practice. Chief amongst these 
obstacles are language barriers, socio-cultural tensions, integration challenges, and the 
interplay between labour-market segmentation and nationality-based discrimination.  
 In terms of labour-market status and occupational positioning, international mobility 
seems to have benefited migrants from the West European EU15 countries more than those 
from the post-2004 accession countries. The former have often achieved upward mobility, 
compared to their non-migrant peers back home, by accessing better occupational positions 
abroad. For the latter group of migrants, the opposite seems to be the case, since they have only 
been able to take up employment in less-prestigious (but, of course, better-paid) jobs compared 
to those who do not migrate (Recchi 2015: 71–72). For East Europeans, and latterly also many 
South Europeans, the main job sectors available are catering, hospitality, construction, 
manufacturing or the domestic service sector, despite many migrants’ third-level qualifications 
(see King et al. 2014: 5; Nowicka 2014: 172; Recchi 2015: 70). As Recchi notes (2015: 72–
73), around 30 per cent of post-accession East Europeans experienced downward mobility 
(initially), and they are also prone to insecure, temporary modes of employment. Nevertheless, 
the post-2004 (A8) migrants’ labour-market position seems to have improved over time, 
whereas the ‘A2’ Romanians and Bulgarians continue to occupy a more disadvantaged position 
on the pan-European labour market (Recchi 2015: 73–74). 
 As an example of East Europeans’ predisposition to downward occupational mobility 
on migration, Trevena’s (2013) research on university-educated Polish migrants in London 
identifies a combination of factors which channel Polish graduates into low-skilled 
employment, at least initially. Trevena identifies three types of graduate migrant, based on their 
reasons to migrate: 
 
 ‘drifters’, whose migration is driven by the desire to travel, learn a new language and live 
in a global city; 
 ‘target earners’, for whom financial motivations prevail; and 
 ‘career-seekers’, who migrate to progress their careers long-term. 
 
Whilst most participants in Trevena’s study started as ‘drifters’ and accessed low-skilled jobs 
initially, they tended to become ‘career-seekers’ over time, on the look-out for better 
employment opportunities. 
 In another study on Polish graduates in the UK, Szewczyk (2014) likewise identifies 
three types of migrant, depending on their career trajectories: 
 
 ‘continuers’, who found employment in their field of expertise, often after following further 
education and training in the UK;  
 ‘switchers’, who showed flexibility in undertaking additional studies or training in a 
different field and thus changed their career direction; and  
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 ‘late awakeners’, who exhibited lower levels of confidence in their ability to progress (often 
due to poor language skills), worked in ‘ordinary’ jobs and saw their careers stagnate for a 
time, before attempting to move up at a later stage. 
 
Both of these studies by Trevena and Szewczyk demonstrate that, although East European 
migrants may experience downward occupational mobility in the early stages of migration, 
there is scope for improvement over time. There are also other positive dimensions, relating to 
the enjoyment of guaranteed higher wages than at home, and the perception of security and 
independence brought by these otherwise ordinary jobs, compared to the previous job market 
in the home country (White 2016: 14). 
 Two further studies offer useful insights into East Europeans’ labour market transition. 
Parutis (2014) interviewed 64 young Polish and Lithuanian migrants in London, most of whom 
were graduates in their 20s and 30s. She found them to be highly mobile within the British 
labour market, after an initial phase of down-skilling. Provided they possess, or acquire over 
time, sufficient language skills, these young migrants move from a first stage where they accept 
‘any job’ in order to survive and secure a steady income, to a ‘better job’ with improved status 
and pay, to finally (but for some only) their ‘dream job’, which fully matches their experience 
and aspiration to achieve self-development and job satisfaction. 
 The second set of insights comes from Nowicka’s (2014) study of (yet again) Polish 
migrants in the UK. Nowicka critiques the common understanding of skills as ‘fixed attributes’ 
that migrants possess and that researchers study in the receiving-country context. She 
highlights the role of the context of origin in understanding de-skilling, as well as the process 
of validating skills in the destination country. An important contribution that this study makes 
is the distinction between ‘migrating skills’, which refers to skills that can be transferred abroad 
more easily, and ‘migration skills’, which refers to strategies used by migrants to ‘validate’ and 
‘develop’ their skills abroad. Whilst migrants’ skills and work experiences gained in Poland 
are not easily recognised in the UK, Polish migrants can draw on ‘migration skills’, such as 
their hard-working nature, reliability, flexibility and willingness to work long hours, to 
compensate for skills that remain unrecognised.  
 Compared to East Europeans, West Europeans tend to face fewer difficulties in terms 
of skills recognition and pursuing desired careers. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that they achieve ‘upward social mobility’, although this may be possible, particularly for those 
from more modest social backgrounds, and those for whom the destination country or city 
offers what Fielding (1992) has called an ‘escalator’ effect, accelerating career development in 
a dynamic and open high-skilled labour market, such as London (King et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, West Europeans are not entirely protected from the typical challenges of working 
in a new environment and institutional culture. For example, in their study of French 
professionals working in the finance sector in London, Mulholland and Ryan (2014) describe 
the challenges which French employees face in relation to differences in work culture, level of 
English language proficiency and social norms of behaviour in and outside the workplace.  
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Social networks and identities beyond the ‘national’ 
Another important theme in current research on high-skilled European migrants concerns their 
social integration, particularly in terms of the local and transnational social networks they 
develop post-migration. Intra-European movers may be thought to experience fewer 
difficulties in terms of social integration, given their ‘whiteness’ and cultural similarity (Favell 
and Nebe 2009: 206). West European migrants have indeed been seen as broadly unproblematic 
or neglected in public or political discourse, but the reception of East Europeans has been 
dramatically different, generating anxiety and negative press coverage in some of the societies 
of reception (Favell and Nebe 2009; Fox et al. 2012). In addition, as we saw above, East 
Europeans have held a more precarious and visible labour-market status if we consider, for 
example, the transitional restrictions on access to employment they faced in various EU 
countries for certain periods of time after enlargement. Despite these differences in legal status, 
reception and perception, both West and East Europeans encounter various informal barriers 
to becoming full members of the host society – for example, difficulties in everyday 
communication and language proficiency, in building social ties to the local population, or in 
accessing local institutions and resources related to health services, education, childcare, 
housing etc. (Favell 2008). 
 Challenges to building friendships with locals are a common outcome amongst both 
‘old’ and ‘new’ Eurostars, including those positioned at the very elite end (Kennedy 2008; 
Scott 2007). For example, Ryan and Mulholland (2014a) show, in the case of the French in 
London, that even those successful in building professional relationships are not necessarily 
able to convert these links into personal friendships, especially with ‘natives’. Nevertheless, 
the literature documenting high-skilled Europeans’ friendship networks often shows that they 
do not simply seek the company of co-nationals or co-ethnics to compensate for the problem 
of social isolation from the native population. Indeed, many groups seem to consciously avoid 
or distance themselves from co-nationals (Gilmartin and Migge 2015; Moroşanu and Fox 2013; 
Mueller 2015). This may be for various reasons and result in different outcomes. For instance, 
young German graduates living in London profess their wish to stay away from other Germans 
and instead forge friendships with the ‘locals’. But they find this difficult, because people seem 
so busy, a lot of time is spent on commuting and, in a cosmopolitan city like London, ‘true 
locals’ are hard to find. As a result, Germans do socialise with each other, and many also keep 
in close touch with their friends and family in Germany (Mueller 2015; also King et al. 2014: 
9–16). In the case of East Europeans abroad, high levels of mutual suspicion and the 
internalisation of migrants’ negative image abroad may contribute to minimising co-ethnic 
bonding (on Romanians in the UK, see Moroşanu and Fox 2013). For all nationalities who 
have moved, their quest for new experiences, for a cosmopolitan lifestyle, and their ‘normal’ 
work and leisure interests may simply lead them to develop a range of friendship ties and 
common activities which span naturally across ethno-national boundaries, irrespective of 
‘home’ or ‘host’ nationalities (Favell 2008; Moroşanu 2013; Ryan 2015; Ryan and Mulholland 
2014a). 
 High-skilled Europeans’ socialisation patterns and mobility experiences raise 
interesting questions about the way these migrants identify themselves. In his study of West 
European ‘Eurostars’, Favell (2008: 101–103) notes their reluctance to self-identify as 
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‘migrants’, partly due to the perceived negative connotation of the term, the distance that they 
felt from the trajectories and lives of ‘typical’ (non-European or ‘third-country’) migrants, or 
the perceived ‘permanent’ character of migration, which hardly reflected their situation. But 
neither were these young elites and middling transnationals able to easily find an alternative 
label for themselves. Several were suggested – ‘free movers’, ‘expats’, ‘Europeans’ – but none 
of these gained widespread traction. 
 Although they may reject the ‘migrant’ or ‘immigrant’ label, high-skilled Europeans 
often move in ‘international social worlds’ in their destination, as discussed above and in lively 
and amusing detail by Favell (2008). And as Kennedy (2010) noted in his work on EU 
postgraduates in Manchester, migration means, for many, an exposure to individuals from a 
variety of backgrounds, leading to ‘life-changing experiences abroad’ and more cosmopolitan 
identities, which eclipse or complement national modes of belonging. Kennedy employs 
Beck’s (2004) notion of ‘forced cosmopolitanism’ to underscore the weight of economic 
factors influencing graduates’ decision to leave their country of origin. In other words, it is not 
cosmopolitanism per se that usually serves as the sole or main reason for migration amongst 
this group, but the difficulties in obtaining a suitable job in the ‘socially conservative and 
hierarchical work culture’ prevailing in their home countries (Kennedy 2010: 472). 
Subsequently, the actual experience of living and working abroad functions to enhance 
migrants’ knowledge of and openness towards other cultures, and leads them to be more critical 
of their own culture. In the case of Italian graduates in London, there is almost a dis-
identification and disembedding from Italian society, rejected as gerontocratic, patriarchal and 
corrupt (Conti and King 2015). Examining the networks forged by Romanians in London, 
Moroşanu (2013) also highlights the cosmopolitan nature of everyday socialisation and 
cosmopolitan orientations amongst migrants working in both high- and lower-skilled 
occupations, with the difference that, for the former, these were more often the result of choice 
and initial aspirations, whereas for the latter they tended to be more the outcome of shared, 
often negative, experience abroad.  
 Alongside the concern with the development of cosmopolitan identities and 
dispositions, another strand of research on identity examines the extent to which intra-European 
mobility might foster European identities and an attachment to Europe – a theme that was 
already introduced in our earlier discussion of evolving student identifications. In order to 
illustrate some of the empirical complexity of analysing various combinations of national 
(home vs host nation), European and cosmopolitan identities, we refer to four examples from 
the literature, two based on quantitative methods and two based on qualitative approaches. 
 In the first study we review, Rother and Nebe (2009) use the dataset from the PIONEUR 
project (‘Pioneers of European Integration from Below’) to explore the presence of a European 
identity among free-movers in five EU countries: Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. 
The first headline finding is that, as one would expect, EU movers are significantly more likely 
to have a ‘European’ identity than non-migrants. More specifically, 70 per cent of the mobile 
respondents reported holding some kind of European identity attachment, in combination with 
a country of origin (COO) and/or country of residence (COR) attachment. Half of the sample 
held tripartite identities, that is to say, strong COO identities, strong COR identities, and strong 
European identities. These are the people whom Rother and Nebe (2009: 152) call ‘perfect 
Europeans’ or ‘highly Europeanized citizens’, who find it easy to develop an ‘interculturated’ 
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European identity layer and who experience no conflict between their COO and COR identities. 
This group are nearly all graduates, they speak the COR language, are interested in politics and, 
importantly, have several friends from both the country of origin and that of residence. 
 The remainder of the mobile sample divides into three more or less equal-sized groups: 
 
 those who are attached to both the COO and COR but not to the EU; 
 those who hold European identities but only one national identity (COO or COR); and 
 those who hold one identity only (COO, COR, EU) or profess no identity at all. 
 
As one might expect, these patterns are not uniform across the five countries surveyed. The 
most ‘different’ case is the ‘British effect’. In the concluding words of Rother and Nebe (2009: 
153): ‘Migrants from Britain are a special kind of European movers… they are unlikely to 
develop a tripartite identity... Feeling British and feeling European seem to exclude one another. 
On the other hand, they are most likely to assimilate to the county of residence – either with or 
without nurturing a feeling of Europeanness’. 
 The second quantitative study (Duchêne-Lacroix and Koukoutsaki-Monnier 2016) is 
more geographically specific – French citizens in Berlin. Respondents were asked to self-
identify with four identity categories – French, German, European and cosmopolitan – in any 
combination and priority of importance. Multiple correspondence analysis was applied to 
results from 1000 returned questionnaires of the 3000 sent out, with various identity 
combinations correlated and aligned with self-reported integration indicators. Of the theoretical 
25 identity combinations possible, seven account for 92 per cent of respondents. To summarise 
briefly, people whose identification is either ‘French’ or ‘French/cosmopolitan’ have a very 
low degree of integration into the German culture area. The ‘European’ and ‘European then 
French’ profiles are associated with higher integration indicators into both the French and 
German culture areas than other groups. ‘Franco-Germans’ and ‘Europeans’ are better 
integrated into the German culture area than other groups; conversely, those who nominate 
‘French then European’ show a medium level of integration into the German culture area and 
greater integration into the French one (Duchêne-Lacroix and Koukoutsaki-Monnier 2016: 14). 
 Now, much more briefly, to the two more qualitative studies. Focusing on relatively 
young and highly-skilled Finnish migrants in various European destinations, Koikkalainen 
(2013: 97) finds that, although most participants identify primarily with Finland, they also 
develop over time an attachment to Europe (60 per cent of her sample expressed a primary or 
secondary identification linked to Europe, whilst showing limited interest in identifying with 
the country of destination. Finally, in a more historical review, Logemann (2013) shows that 
there are long-standing associations between migration experiences within (and even beyond) 
Europe that lead to an enhanced sense of ‘Europeanness’.  
 
 
Uncertain futures 
Contrary to what one might expect, the future plans and orientations of high-skilled Europeans 
(defined, remember, by their graduate status rather than by the actual work they do) are often 
marked by uncertainty and ambivalence. The four alternatives are to settle longer-term in the 
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destination country, to return to their home country, to move on to a different country – either 
in Europe or elsewhere in the world – or, finally, to engage in some kind of lifestyle which 
involves continuous international mobility, shuttling back and forth between two or more 
countries. 
 The current absence of legal barriers to intra-EU mobility does not constrain choices 
over future mobility, but this very fact seems to make exercising that choice if anything more 
difficult: all options are theoretically open. Nor does this situation necessarily differ for high- 
vs low-skilled migrants. The precarious nature of employment affecting migrants from the 
Eastern EU states makes it difficult for them to plan for the future, unless they are ‘target 
earners’ who will return once they have accumulated the capital they seek. However, as Favell 
(2008) aptly illustrates in the Eurostars’ case, even those who are occupationally successful 
continue to face a variety of informal barriers in terms of their access to key institutions and 
middle-class lifestyles in the place of destination; these barriers become more concrete and 
visible when contemplating settling long-term, and hence hinder making plans for the future. 
Returning home, on the other hand, may not be an easy option either. As Ryan and Mulholland 
(2014b) found in the case of high-skilled French in London, these were sceptical about the 
possibility to return, resume their careers and transfer the skills and knowledge acquired in 
Britain to the home-country work environment. Similar uncertainties were expressed in the 
comparative studies of Germans, Latvians and Lithuanians in London carried out by King et 
al. (2014, 2015). In these cases, return in the short term was put off by the contrast between 
fast-paced careerist lifestyles in London and the more socially restrictive and limited nature of 
job opportunities in their home countries. However, in the long-term future, looking forward 
to the life-stage of family formation and children’s upbringing and education, ideas of return 
were generally more certain. 
 In fact, very few studies have been carried out on the return migration of intra-EU 
skilled migrants. Fihel and Górny (2013), using rather old data from the transition period in 
Poland (1989–2002, hence pre-accession), found that return propensity, and the likelihood of 
staying in Poland longer and not re-emigrating, were positively correlated with higher human 
capital, stronger family ties, and location in Polish urban areas. On the whole these findings 
are consonant with earlier research about the factors shaping return decisions – the relative 
costs of living vis-à-vis wages, safety and security, children’s education, cultural attachment 
and feelings of nostalgia (Cassarino 2004; Dustmann and Weiss 2007; Gmelch 1980). 
 In a more recent study on highly qualified migrants in Lithuania, Barcevičius (2015) 
finds that these graduate returnees are successfully reintegrated in rewarding professions, 
including many who are self-employed and business owners. The findings are based on a 
combination of questionnaire survey and interview data. However, the author acknowledges 
that, by focusing on the actual return migrants, the perspective of high-skilled non-returnees is 
missed. 
 We shall have more to say about return migration when we discuss the return of the 
lower-skilled labour migrants who are the subject of the next section. 
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Lower-skilled migrant workers 
In this part of the paper we lay out what is known, and where the gaps are, in the literature on 
lower-skilled migrating youth, and how their mobility relates to transitions from school to work, 
from unemployment to employment, and from adolescence to adulthood. We have already 
problematised the definition and conceptualisation of ‘skill’ earlier in the paper; from now on, 
we pragmatically define the lower-skill category as made up of migrating young people without 
third-level or university qualifications. At this level, too, there remains the problem of the 
mismatch between ‘skill’ and ‘education’ as a result of migration. In previous sections we noted 
the persistent phenomenon of occupational downgrading, especially of migrating graduates 
from Eastern Europe and, in the wake of the crisis, from Southern Europe, too (for additional 
references see Ciobanu 2015; Galgóczi et al. 2012; Johnston et al. 2015; Voitchovsky 2014). 
At the lower-skilled end, we prefer to relativise this category: rather than the almost-
denigratory fixed and static class of the ‘low-skilled’ or ‘unskilled’, we opt for ‘lesser’ or ‘lower’ 
or even ‘differently’ skilled. We further stress the malleability and fluidity of this category, 
returning to an earlier-discussed concept of the ‘learning migrant’ (Williams 2007), who 
constantly learns new skills and perhaps also picks up new training and qualifications in the 
new environment. 
As Kurekova et al. (2013: 2) have pointed out, most of the literature on the lesser-
skilled concentrates on their formal education and (lack of) skills obtained through education. 
This is understandable due to the available statistical data being on an individual level. 
However, this focus on formal education also indicates a lack of theorising and ignorance of 
the existing empirical evidence on the ‘different’ skills these workers have. Kurekova et al. 
(2013: 4) emphasise both cognitive (such as information technology skills, driving skills, 
language skills and, importantly, the ability to learn) as well as   non-cognitive skills (such as 
various personal and social skills like punctuality, team-working and communication skills) in 
lesser and medium skilled professions. Furthermore, personal characteristics and physical 
appearance can also play a role in lesser-skilled professions (2013: 10).  
 Unpacking in a little more detail the non-graduate skills–education mismatch, we can 
observe at the theoretical level a fourfold typology when migration to another country and 
labour market occurs. There are:  
 
 those with minimal education and no formal qualifications who, as expected, find manual-
labour jobs abroad which require no particular skills to perform apart from physical strength 
and/or manual dexterity; 
 those with secondary-level and/or vocational training who manage to find jobs abroad 
which require such qualifications and experience – plumbers, electricians, car mechanics, 
childcare assistants, mid-level service workers etc.;  
 those with these qualifications and experiences who are not able to capitalise on them, 
because of either language barriers, the non-recognition of diplomas, the non-availability 
of jobs in their particular trade, or discrimination against ‘foreign workers’, with the result 
that they are forced to accept lower-skilled work; and, 
 finally, those who embody the ‘learning migrant’ model whereby an initially low human 
capital endowment is improved via the migration process – new skills are learned ‘on the 
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job’, perhaps new qualifications are obtained by part-time study, and an upward skills-
status trajectory is made possible over time.  
 
These work-status and geographical mobility trajectories will be borne in mind in the review 
and analysis presented in the rest of this section. 
 Amongst the key questions that we, with the help of the extant literature, seek to answer 
are the following. How can we better understand the personality and motivations to migrate of 
young and lesser-skilled individuals, and how does international mobility interface with 
biographical and regional-development transitions (cf. Frändberg 2008; Polek et al. 2011)? Are 
there different integration and cultural attachment processes for those with lower levels of 
formal education and in lower-skill jobs? Using a dual lens of intersectionality and translocal 
positionality (Anthias 2002, 2011), how do class, age, gender and places of origin and 
destination intersect in identity shaping? Or, put more straightforwardly, what does ‘doing 
identity’ transnationally mean for people performing lesser-skilled work abroad? 
 Anne White (2010, 2014) is one of the few researchers who has specifically analysed 
the mobility of young, lesser-skilled migrants from Poland to the UK. Revealingly, she found 
that lower-skilled young migrants have more agency than older workers, even if these young 
people without higher education come from poor families and depressed regions. In 
comparison to the higher-skilled, lower-skilled migrant workers rely more on social networks 
– friends, and friends of friends – who are instrumental in helping them to find jobs and 
accommodation abroad (on which see also Ciobanu 2015; Gill and Bialski 2011; White and 
Ryan 2008). 
 As a final scene-setter for this section, we briefly comment on the changing geographies 
and typologies of lower-skilled labour migration in Europe over the long transition from the 
postwar industrial boom to the more recent and current era of post-industrial service economies. 
 
 
Changing geographies and typologies of lower-skilled migration 
From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, there occurred a mass labour migration from the Southern 
European countries to the growing industrial economies of North-West Europe – from the 
‘periphery’ to the ‘core’ of the continent. Estimates vary, but around 10–15 million migrant 
workers, some with family members who also entered the labour market, migrated within and 
into Europe during this era. They migrated from Portugal, Spain, Southern Italy, Greece, 
Yugoslavia and Turkey to France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Sweden. Some also went to the UK, but most labour migration to this country at this time was 
from the Republic of Ireland, the Caribbean and South Asia. Most of these migrants were rural-
origin workers with minimal formal education who were recruited to work in the so-called ‘3D’ 
jobs (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) in factories, on construction sites, and in transport and 
other service sectors which required manual-grade workers. These migrations have been amply 
documented: for two contrasting important studies see Castles and Kosack (1973), and Salt and 
Clout (1976).   
 These were the migrations that helped to underpin the long years of postwar prosperity 
for Europe and that also laid the foundations for the ethnically diverse societies that we see in 
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most West European countries today. The workers were initially recruited on temporary 
contracts as ‘guestworkers’, but most ended up ‘staying for good’ (Castles et al. 1984), having 
brought over or started new families in the destination countries. No large-scale outmigration 
from the Eastern bloc countries took place at this time, due to the effectiveness of the Iron 
Curtain as a migration barrier. Emigration to the capitalist West was forbidden, except from 
Yugoslavia, which relaxed its rules on this in the 1960s and, on a smaller scale, from Poland 
in the 1980s. 
 The geography of intra-European labour migration changed after 1989, and even more 
so after the EU enlargements of 2004 (A10 countries), 2007 (A2 countries) and 2013 (Croatia). 
Now a new labour periphery was opened up for the rich economies of Western Europe to draw 
on, although throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, long-term migration and settlement 
opportunities were limited. Instead, East Europeans got used to various kinds of ‘shuttle’ or 
‘pendular’ migration timed around the length of stay permitted by tourist and visitor visas: in 
the words of Morokvasic (2004), they were ‘settled in mobility’. After 2004, and the accession 
of eight Eastern European countries (plus Malta and Cyprus), the West European labour market 
was opened up, although initially only three countries (the UK, Ireland and Sweden) allowed 
unfettered access to working opportunities; the rest of the EU15 (so, 12 countries) imposed 
transition arrangements which have now expired. 
 Hence for the past decade and more, the main lower-skilled migration flows within 
Europe have been from East to West, with the largest single flow by far being from Poland to 
the UK, which now has around 750,000 Polish residents. Polish workers also moved in large 
numbers to Germany (560,000), Ireland (118,000), Italy (98,000), the Netherlands (86,000), 
Norway (86,000), Spain (70,000), Belgium (65,000), France (50,000) and Sweden (46,000) – 
figures from Eurostat for 2014. Lithuanians and Latvians also migrated in significant numbers 
(relative to their population size) to the UK and Ireland. More recently, Romanians have 
become prominent and widespread in intra-EU migration flows, settling in large numbers 
(around 1 million in each) in Italy and Spain, as well as France, Germany, the UK and 
elsewhere. 
 The final stage in the evolution of intra-European movements of general migrant labour 
comes with the 2008 financial crisis: renewed flows from the countries hit hard by the 
economic downturn (the Baltic Republics, less so Poland); some return migration from the UK 
and other receiving countries as a result of redundancies and the contraction of sectors 
employing lots of migrant workers, such as construction; and also, in the case of returns to 
Poland, substantial re-emigration of those returnees (White 2014). The hard-hit Southern 
European economies also experienced a recession-driven wave of emigration of unemployed 
young people, both graduates and non-graduates. 
 With this geo-temporal background in mind, we now examine a series of labour-market 
transitions. 
 
 
Transition from unemployment to work 
Youth unemployment nowadays in Europe, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, results 
in increasingly regionally and socially polarised life trajectories for young people, especially 
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those with low qualifications. Youth unemployment also imbricates allied phenomena such as 
precarious and part-time employment, temporary or no contracts, and low and uncertain wages, 
all of which make it impossible to establish an independent life in the home country. For lesser-
skilled young people, the most dangerous symptoms are related to the high unemployment rate 
in many regions/countries (especially in the crisis-hit peripheral economies), the low levels of 
vocational training, poor geographical mobility and lack of willingness to move internally 
within their respective countries to places where their job chances might be better. Both in 
Central-Eastern Europe and in Southern EU countries, there is a generally low level of trust in 
measures taken by the government to resolve the dire situation of unemployed young people; 
and in some countries, too, a lack of support or initiatives coming from trade unions, who are 
more concerned to defend the rights of their older, established members (Grabowska and Getka 
2014: 2). 
 The problem of youth unemployment varies markedly between countries, being 
particularly high in Spain, Italy and Greece, especially during the years of the financial crisis, 
but it is also a regional problem within countries. In Spain and Italy, it is their southern regions 
which have consistently posted high youth unemployment rates, in some instances in excess of 
50 per cent. Schemes and policies that encourage the internal relocation of the unemployed are 
not usually economically viable for the lesser-skilled younger workers with low earning power. 
Rents and other accommodation costs in the cities where more jobs are available are high, and 
there is a lack of affordable housing and of housing support for the internal migration of young 
people leaving their family homes in peripheral areas (Grabowska and Getka 2014: 4). 
Exceptions to this situation arise when there is a prior family history of internal migration (for 
instance from Southern Spain to Barcelona or Madrid, or from Southern Italy to Rome or 
Milan), so that young unemployed people from the ‘south’ have relatives they can lodge with 
when looking for new jobs in the ‘north’. 
 These exceptions apart, on the whole, unemployed young people get a more positive 
economic return with international migration, for several reasons (Magrini and Lemistre 2013: 
292). First, within and across Europe (and especially across the East–West divide), wage 
differentials for all kinds of work are much wider than they are within countries – more detail 
on this will be given in the next subsection. Second, international mobility is often facilitated 
by institutionalised recruitment channels and social networks. Although recruitment channels 
can be discriminatory, filtering out the ‘good’ or ‘ideal’ migrant from the rest (Findlay et al. 
2013), they are effective in recruiting and placing migrants in specific employment sectors such 
as hospitality, construction or IT work, and overcoming otherwise difficult obstacles of 
language, bureaucracy and ‘cold’ job applications. At a more informal level, personal networks 
of other family members (siblings, cousins) and friends (former schoolmates, friends from the 
same town or village) provide tangible help in finding jobs and places to live. Finally, 
international, as opposed to internal, migration appeals because of the chance of a more 
exciting and challenging life experience; insights into this aspect of lower-skilled migration 
will be given presently. 
 Another important element helping to explain the growth of unemployment and the way 
this leads to the emigration of non-graduates relates to the shift in attitudes towards different 
‘types’ of education. In Central and Eastern European countries, there has been a widespread 
and pronounced desire for education after the collapse of the socialist system, during which 
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time the emphasis was relentlessly on productive work rather than on ‘bourgeois’ further and 
higher education. But this new aspiration for more, and higher, education happened hand-in-
hand with a devaluing of technical and vocational education. Therefore it is graduates who 
have a competitive advantage on the labour market over those who have ‘only’ attended 
secondary or vocational schools. This relates not so much to the ‘real’ qualifications needed to 
perform some jobs (such as office and technical work, or retailing, for example), but more to 
the ‘prestige’ of a university degree, even if the degree (for instance, in literature or philosophy) 
has little bearing on the work done. The post-socialist devaluation of the ‘working-class act’ of 
manual craft and technical work means that young people with these non-graduate skills are 
little appreciated on their domestic labour markets; yet these skills are more in demand, and 
better rewarded financially, in other EU countries. 
 Something of the same kind also happened in the Southern EU countries where the 
elevated prestige, but over-supply, of graduates, especially in non-vocational arts subjects, 
means that, in the domestic labour markets of these countries, graduates have been increasingly 
employed in mid-level jobs for which their graduate status is not strictly needed. In this 
scenario too, then, non-graduates, with or without tangible qualifications, are relegated to the 
ranks of the unemployed or casually employed, and are stimulated to seek work abroad. 
 
 
From low pay in the country of origin to lesser-skilled work abroad 
Low pay, precarious work and outright unemployment in the home country form a powerful 
cocktail of migration-driving push factors – as has been shown in the history of labour 
migration worldwide (Constant and Zimmermann 2013; van den Broeck 1996). This 
encourages young workers to move abroad to seek almost any job that will pay significantly 
better than the (often limited) work opportunities at home. These, in a nutshell, have been the 
structural conditions shaping non-graduate labour migration in very recent decades. In what 
follows, we focus once again mainly on the archetype of this phenomenon – Polish migration 
to the UK – since this has been on such an unprecedentedly large scale, and has spawned an 
extensive research literature (for a selection of the studies available see Burrell 2009; Datta 
2009; Datta and Brickell 2009; Drinkwater et al. 2009; Garapich 2008; Knight et al. 2014; 
Ryan et al. 2008; Stenning and Danley 2009; Trevena et al. 2013; White 2010, 2016). 
 In 2003, on the eve of the accession the following year, the average wage in Poland was 
just one-fifth of the EU15 average, indicating a powerful incentive to migrate. By 2007, after 
the initial post-accession surge in emigration, this had risen, but not by much, to one-quarter. 
In Latvia, the respective figures were 13 and 18 per cent, roughly one-eighth to one-sixth 
(Galgóczi et al. 2009: 10). Hence, even low-paid and ‘undesirable’ work in the UK and other 
countries in North-West Europe with high wage levels was financially rewarding and made the 
emigration worthwhile, since incomes earned abroad were many times greater than what could 
be earned at home, no matter what jobs were available. This differential also explains the 
syndrome of skills downgrading described earlier, whereby even teachers, office workers and 
other mid-level professionals were willing to give up their steady and poorly paid jobs in 
Eastern European countries to take much better paying but menial jobs in the more wealthy EU 
countries. 
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 The main occupations for Central and East Europeans in the UK in the post-accession 
years were in the lesser-skilled echelons of the labour market. According to data cited in 
Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009) and Wills et al. (2009), the most common occupations 
were factory and warehouse work (34 per cent). Other popular job sectors were domestic and 
office cleaning (especially for women), auxiliary work in construction and property 
maintenance (for men) as well as hospitality (both genders). Overwhelmingly at this stage 
(between 2004 and the recession), Poles were employed in ‘routine’ (43 per cent) and semi-
routine’ (31 per cent) occupations; far fewer in managerial and professional (10 per cent) and 
skilled and intermediate positions (16 per cent). The picture was broadly the same for other A8 
migrants with, if anything, a greater share in the routine and semi-routine jobs (Drinkwater et 
al. 2009: 170). 
 Within the UK, and probably within other destination countries, too, there were 
recruitment stereotypes associated with Poles and other East European workers, hired for their 
physical strength and endurance, and their expected good and reliable work performance. As 
several studies have demonstrated (Findlay et al. 2013; Mackenzie and Forde 2009; Parutis 
2011; Shubin et al. 2014), their attributes of being ‘white, European, and hard working’ (Parutis 
2011) gave these intra-EU migrants a competitive and social advantage over other, non-EU 
migrants, especially those perceived as culturally and ‘visibly’ different. As Shubin et al. (2014: 
467) pointed out, in the case of Latvian recruiting agents imagining an ideal lesser-skilled 
worker, he or she does not need a ‘big head’ (ie. brains) but rather ‘big feet’ for filling 
‘wellington boots’ to work in agriculture or construction. McDowell (2009) drew parallels 
between post-2004 migration into the UK and an earlier wave of ‘white’ European migrants 
recruited under the European Volunteer Worker scheme during 1946–1949. Sixty years later, 
the UK Labour government favoured A8 migrants as part of its ‘managed migration policy’ to 
fill gaps in low-wage sectors with Europeans, rather than with third-country-nationals from 
other parts of the world. Although the scale of migration, facilitated by the UK’s signing up to 
immediate free movement and labour market access in 2004, exceeded all expectations, 
economic calculations by Dustmann and Frattini (2014) showed that these large injections of 
European labour played an important role in driving forward the UK’s booming economy in 
those years. A8 migrants, as well as other intra-EU migrants, made a large net fiscal 
contribution to the UK economy. This was due to the fact that, as largely young and healthy 
single workers, working full-time without much unemployment, they put into the national 
exchequer, via taxes, far more than they took out. 
 Although the work that they do can be monotonous and physically demanding, some 
of it out in all weathers, both the skilled and less-skilled migrants who perform this physical 
work gain job satisfaction and even pride in what they do. They do not feel themselves to be 
victims as exploited labourers, above all because of the stark contrast between the wage-levels 
characteristic of West European and post-socialist countries (Ciupijus 2011: 544). They are 
also, on the whole, tolerant of these arduous physical jobs because such work is often perceived 
by them as an interim stage before progression to better employment, or return home to 
capitalise on the invested savings and work experiences accumulated. 
 According to May et al. (2007: 163), the large-scale and steady influx of new intra-EU 
migrants into the UK economy enabled employers to fill vacancies without the need to increase 
wages or improve working conditions. The overall effect, especially in London, was to relieve 
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bottle-necks in an otherwise tight labour market and hold down wage inflation. For the labour 
migrants themselves, they have little room to manœuvre in campaigning for better pay and 
conditions, since the sectors they work in have high rates of labour turnover and a ready supply 
of new migrants willing to accept the prevailing conditions, including irregular migrants from 
non-EU countries (Bloch 2013: 284; see also McDowell et al. 2007). 
 As a complement and an antidote to this predominantly economic labour market 
analysis, we change tune now to some more ethnographic evidence. There is an abundance of 
this in the literature, so let us simply select one example from the well-known case of Polish 
building and house-repair workers in London. This enables us to illustrate not only the working 
lives of these migrants but also their social encounters with others in their multicultural 
neighbourhoods of residence. Using the optic of ‘translocal geographies’, Datta (2011) 
evocatively describes the various neighbourhoods where Poles live cheek-by-jowl with other 
immigrants, both long-established and recently arrived like themselves. In the ‘global 
ethnoscape’ (Appadurai 1991) of Green Lanes, a centre of London’s Turkish and Kurdish 
communities, Poles find a congenial space in which to interact with other cultures and 
nationalities, feel comfortably at home, and live a straightforward life where all their shopping 
and service needs are on their doorstep, once the more challenging exigences of finding work 
and somewhere to sleep have been resolved. There are many other such diverse urban spaces 
in the interstices of London, pockets of cheaper housing where livelihoods can be sustained in 
a mobile habitus linking house-improvement and building projects in richer neighbourhoods 
with the need to find living accommodation in cheap neighbourhoods alongside Asians, Afro-
Caribbeans, Middle Easterners and other East Europeans. The result, as Datta discusses in 
another paper (2009), is the production of a kind of working-class everyday cosmopolitanism 
for those Poles-on-the-move which is very different from their monocultural society back home. 
  
 
From temporary to more-permanent work 
According to data presented and discussed by Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009), during the 
mid-late 2000s, about half of the A8 migrant workers in the UK were holding temporary jobs. 
This proportion was even higher in agriculture – 70 per cent. By contrast, in another sector 
typical for lower-skilled migrant jobs – hospitality and catering – only 20 per cent were in 
temporary employment. Quite apart from the definitional difficulty of clearly distinguishing 
temporary from permanent work in a deregulated labour market, what is more important is the 
fact that 97 per cent of A8 immigrants were working full-time, with many picking up overtime 
as well. 
 Regarding incomes, 77 per cent were earning between £4.50 and £9.99 per hour 
(Blanchflower and Shadforth 2009: 154) at that time, thereby confirming the low-wage status 
of at least three-quarters of the A8 migrants. Average wages were below those of both the 
native workforce and other, ‘third-country’, immigrants. This latter finding is maybe surprising 
but is explained by the fact that entry to the EU and Britain from ‘outside’ Europe is mainly 
based on the principle of recruiting only the highly skilled, whereas, under the free movement 
of labour, intra-EU migrants can access all jobs, with the result that perhaps too many end up 
in low-paid, less-skilled jobs despite the fact that many possess good qualifications, and are 
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hence over-qualified for the jobs that they do (Blanchflower and Shadforth 2009: 162). Those 
with better and improving English skills and those with higher education are the ones the most 
likely to be successful in moving to a better job sooner or later; for some, further promotion to 
their ‘dream job’ may occur (Parutis 2014). The transition to better jobs for the less-educated 
is less-well documented, and would seem to be a gap in the research literature. 
 However, here are two examples of this kind of transition from low-paid temporary 
work to somewhat better-paid permanent, full-time employment: the first within the same 
sector, the second achieved by switching sectors. 
 Jobs in the tourism and hospitality sector are usually seen as ‘low-paid, low-skilled, 
monotonous, highly-pressurised, involving poor working conditions, part-time and seasonal, 
not family friendly and with poor management and career structures’ (Janta et al. 2012: 433). 
In these jobs, seasonal vacancies and word of mouth make access to temporary employment 
relatively quick and easy and, for many migrants with limited qualifications, this kind of work 
serves as an entrance job immediately after arrival. Although these jobs are often very poorly 
paid in terms of fixed wages, many workers receive tips, subsidised accommodation and free 
food, so that their basic wage is supplemented. Being intensively exposed to tourists from all 
over the world gives migrant workers the chance to improve their languages and awareness of 
other cultures; as a result, many report job satisfaction through this learning process. For some, 
the very temporariness of work is, or becomes, a lifestyle choice, especially for young and 
single workers (Janta et al. 2012: 433). For others, language improvements and on-the-job 
training and experience are the route to promotion within the sector, for instance to head cleaner 
or porter, or even to ‘front-of-house’ positions in restaurants and hotels. However, it has to be 
pointed out that the tourism/hospitality sector is ‘bottom-heavy’, with a very low ratio of 
permanent managerial staff to casual, temporary, part-time and seasonal employees. 
 Like the tourism sector, agriculture is another field of work reliant on short-term 
migrant labour, especially where the farming regimes are intensive and specialised, requiring 
sudden inputs of labour at harvest time. Here both the social and physical environments are 
tougher – no interesting tourists to interact with, and hard physical labour out of doors. 
Reported job satisfaction is generally lower, except for those who are specifically looking for 
seasonal work in order to achieve modest target savings, or to integrate with other work or 
responsibilities in their home country. On the whole, migrant workers in agriculture in Europe 
are structurally disempowered: working in remote places on short-term contracts, they are 
disengaged from trade unions and have weak bargaining power to petition for higher wages. In 
the case of this job sector, a move to better-paid and more-secure work involves a shift to a 
different area of employment such as factory work or work in the hospitality or care sector. In 
the Channel Island of Guernsey, where young Latvian women were recruited to work 
seasonally in the greenhouses of the horticultural sector in the 1990s and early 2000s, many 
have made the transition to full-time work in the island’s hotel, care and retail businesses (King 
and Lulle 2015). 
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Establishing a home and returning from work abroad 
In the mid-late 2000s, migrants from the A10 countries in the UK were much more likely to be 
living in households with at least three adults, yet not living with a spouse, than was the case 
for either UK natives or migrants from non-A10 origins (the figures are 48, 24 and 27 per cent 
respectively; Blanchflower and Shadforth 2009: 155). The same data source shows that only 7 
per cent of A10 worker-migrants had dependents living with them – but it should be 
remembered that this refers to the situation a decade ago, soon after the onset of post-accession 
migration. The data cited above indicate, in synthesis, two things: first that the model of the 
‘single A8 migrant’ was still common throughout most of the 2000s (cf. White 2010: 578) and, 
second, that these single, low-paid migrants were living in poor conditions in multi-occupation 
households, presumably sharing with other single migrant workers. Ethnographic evidence 
from Datta (2011) upholds this general picture for young Polish men in London. 
 This means, in turn, that the transition to full adulthood, family formation and an 
independent home is achieved with difficulty under these conditions, up against practical and 
economic barriers (De Valk and Liefbroer 2007). When this transition does finally occur, as it 
does in a growing number of cases, it is usually achieved alongside improving knowledge of 
the host-country language, the learning of other skills and the passage to more secure and well-
paid employment. Seasonal, low-paid and low-skilled work in agriculture or tourism, or the 
mobile life of a construction worker, are not ideal conditions under which to start family life in 
the destination society. But as soon as stable work and housing are acquired by migrants, 
conditions are better for inviting partners, spouses and children to join them abroad (White 
2010: 578). 
 Another important dimension framing the intra-European mobility of young migrants 
is the urban vs rural context of their various moves. Ever since the early years of the era of 
industrialisation, the migration of young adults from rural and remote areas to cities and 
industrialised areas has been regarded as a ‘normalised’ process (Zelinsky 1971). This can take 
place through either internal or international migration. However, there is a need to better 
understand the cultural meanings and attachments to places that young people are moving from 
and to (Easthope and Gabriel 2008; Nugin 2014). Moving to urban regions may be associated 
with the realisation of aspirations and empowerment but it can also lead to frustration, 
disillusionment and alienation. The possibility or likelihood of return migration opens up new 
place-based decisions and attachments. To where, exactly, does the return take place? Migrants 
may return to their rural regions of origin which, even if they are constantly changing 
(developing and modernising, or depopulating and declining), may offer a quality of life that 
young people could not find in urban centres, especially when they plan to establish their own 
homes and a family. Or, because of the difficulty of finding remunerative and satisfying work 
in such rural regions in their home country, they may relocate to urban centres, where they are 
likely to face the same dilemma as when they were working abroad – that the best employment 
chances are available in cities where the housing and living costs are highest. 
 As noted earlier, there is rather little known about the return, resettlement and 
reintegration processes of intra-European younger migrants. Much of what we say here below 
is theoretical and speculative rather than based on solid empirical research, although a few 
studies can be cited.  
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For ‘target earners’ the return is planned ahead, with a specified outcome often in mind, 
such as acquiring the capital to build or renovate a house or buy an apartment. The question 
then is: What happens next? How does the returnee survive long-term in the home country? 
Re-emigration may be the economically logical or necessary option (White 2014). 
 On the other hand, the return may constitute the ultimate youth transition to full 
adulthood – settling down, establishing a home, starting a family etc. This may be the logical 
outcome of the whole combined migration and life transition cycle, or it may be fraught with 
difficulties and uncertainties, not only about finding work but also in terms of social 
reintegration and evolving identity processes. Lesser-skilled migrants will have learned some 
new work and other skills whilst abroad, but how relevant are they to the return socio-economic 
environment? On the downside, migration abroad can also deplete human capital (through de-
skilling), diminish social capital (loss of previous friendship networks) and even be financially 
disadvantageous (if the economics of the project do not work out); these negative aspects can 
make return migration more difficult (Anacka and Fihel 2012). 
 If there is difficulty getting work on return, ‘reverse transitions’ may take place – from 
employment to unemployment, or from full-time employment to casual and part-time work, or 
at lower rates of pay. For some lower-skilled returnees (and higher-skilled ones, too), the 
solution may be to use the financial capital and work experience gained abroad to set up a small 
business – a trend that has been noted with studies of return migration in other geographical 
and historical contexts (Gmelch 1980; King 1986, 2000). Another, broader, reverse transition 
occurs when migrants return to their parental family home; the independent living, self-reliance 
and earning capacity experienced abroad are partially lost when they return to being adult 
children living with their parents. 
 We round off this review of return by referencing a couple of insightful quantitative 
studies, both set within the context of West-to-East return. The first (Martin and Radu 2012) 
analyses the return component of the EU Labour Force Survey, supplemented by data from the 
European Social Survey; the period covered is 2002–2007. Taken as a share of the active-age 
population in 2006–2008, returnees (native-born persons who had spent at least six months 
abroad in the previous 10 years) generally comprise 6–9 per cent for most A8 and A2 countries: 
the highest values are for Estonia (9.1 per cent) and Poland (8.0), the lowest Hungary (2.6) and 
Slovenia (4.3). Returnees were found to have a mix of sometimes contradictory characteristics. 
There was evidence of a positive selection at return, compared to both non-migrants and to 
migrant non-returnees, and there was an income premium of 10–45 per cent for their work 
abroad, depending on length of time abroad and job sector. Yet returnees were more likely to 
be unemployed post-return, as well as more likely to be in self-employment. 
 The second study is based on a survey of 654 Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian labour 
migrants in the Netherlands (Snel et al. 2015). The authors find, firstly, that a substantial 
proportion intended to stay in the Netherlands ‘for some years’ (2–10 years, 30 per cent) and 
an impressive number (25 per cent) ‘forever’ or ‘until retirement’. A similar proportion had no 
clear plans (28 per cent). In the rest of the paper, Snel et al. test three hypotheses about return 
intentions – note that this is about intentions to return, not actual return. The first hypothesis is 
economic but bifurcates into two competing hypotheses based in turn on neoclassical 
economics (NE) and on the new economics of labour migration (NELM). NE theory argues 
that ‘successful’ migrants will settle long-term in the destination country, whereas ‘failures’ 
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will return because of their miscalculation of the relative costs and benefits of their move. 
NELM posits the inverse, in that successful migrants, who achieved their target in migrating, 
will return; whereas the ‘failures’, who failed to earn enough to return and are ashamed of it, 
will be forced to stay on. As a parenthetical note, in their review of German guestworker return 
migration, Constant and Massey (2002) argue that NE and NELM are not conflicting theories 
but complementary, applying to different types of migrant, respectively income maximisers 
and target earners.  
 The second hypothesis, about socio-cultural integration, is more straightforward. In a 
nutshell, those who are more socially and culturally integrated in the host society and identify 
more with it than with the homeland, are less likely to return. Conversely the third hypothesis, 
relating to transnationalism theory, argues that migrants who ‘forge and sustain multi-stranded 
social relations that link together their societies of origin and of settlement’ (Basch et al. 1994: 
7) will be more likely to return. 
 Results from the analysis of Snel et al. (2015) are as follows. The socio-cultural 
integration and transnationalism hypotheses are clearly supported. Those who felt themselves 
to be highly integrated in Dutch society had weak return intentions, whereas those who kept in 
touch regularly with their country of origin via regular visits and remittance-sending, had high 
return intentions. On the two alternative economic hypotheses the results are more mixed, 
indicating that both ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ intend to return home, but for different reasons. 
However, on the whole, NE theory seems to be more powerful and logical for this group of 
survey respondents. 
 
 
Conclusions and policy perspectives 
This review has demonstrated the existence of a wealth of literature on young people’s 
migration and mobility within Europe. Much of this literature is very recent, a product of the 
last few years and the wide availability of European and national research grants to fund this 
work. The literature continues to grow very fast, making this kind of literature review survey a 
challenge. Our review here is far from comprehensive, but we believe it covers the main types 
of youth migration and gives an idea of the main processes under way for each of the three 
nominated categories of young migrants – students, graduate-level workers and lower-skilled 
workers. 
We have not attempted a systematic coverage of the EU’s 28 countries, nor have we 
surveyed the literatures in languages other than English – a major limitation. Our coverage of 
the continent is thus geographically patchy, as is the overall geographical distribution of the 
literature. Of recent flows within Europe, Polish migration to the UK is both the largest 
statistically and has attracted by far the most attention in the scholarly literature. We are very 
aware that there are some, mostly smaller, countries which are hardly mentioned in this review, 
such as Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, for example. 
The paper is now rounded off with some brief insights into the policy realm. First, we 
note a selection of EU-level policies; then some national-scale ones. All relate to fostering 
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youth mobility, especially but not always in the context of transitions into work, and 
contributing to ‘development’ in some way. We also point to some policy gaps. 
At the European level, the main problem to be tackled is youth unemployment. In 2013, 
according to the Commission, nearly 6 million people in the EU under the age of 25 were 
unemployed, and a total of 7.5 million were ‘NEET’ – not in education, employment or training. 
Youth unemployment, as noted earlier, is highly uneven across the EU, both between countries 
and regionally within countries. There are complex relationships between unemployment and 
migration but, on the whole, emigration has traditionally been high from high-unemployment 
countries, sometimes on a scale sufficient to produce a significant decline in youth 
unemployment, and hence overall unemployment, in these emigration source countries. For 
instance, in the Baltic States, migration has contributed to a sharp decline in youth 
unemployment in recent years (King et al. 2005). According to an OECD (2013) report, the 
profile of youth migration from the Baltics has changed in recent years. Young Latvians are 
more likely to be students or graduates and are oriented to long-term or even permanent 
settlement abroad, whereas Estonians are mainly male labour migrants working in the 
construction industry in Finland, and highly return-oriented. The Lithuanian migrant profile is 
somewhat intermediate between the above two, but closer to the Latvian one: young people 
dominate (55 per cent of emigrants are aged 20–34) and more than half of these had upper-
secondary vocational qualifications, according to recent years’ statistics. Since both the 
immigration and birth rates are very low in these three countries, there are concerns about 
demographic decline, already in evidence from recent censuses. Policies for encouraging return 
migration have therefore been activated in recent years, and are gaining some modest impact 
now that the worst years of the economic crisis are over. 
With the alarmingly high levels of youth unemployment across large parts of the EU, 
the Commission has made youth employment a major priority, with links to improving 
education and training. The Commission aims to reduce school drop-out rates to below 10 per 
cent, and to have at least 40 per cent of those aged 30–34 years completing third-level education 
by 2020. 
Youth on the Move, launched in 2010, is a comprehensive package of policy initiatives 
on education and employment for young people in Europe, and part of the ‘Europe 2020’ 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. In a nutshell, ‘Youth on the Move’ aims 
to improve young people’s education and employability, in order to reduce the unacceptably 
high youth unemployment rate and to increase the youth-employment rate – in line with the 
EU’s wider target of achieving a 75 per cent employment rate for the working-age population 
(20–64 years). The objective to make education and training more geared to the needs of both 
young people and the labour market, encouraging more of them to take advantage of EU grants 
to study or train in another country, and to encourage EU countries to take measures which will 
ease the education–work transition. 
In order to increase youth employability, the largest policy is the Youth Guarantee, 
endorsed by EU countries in April 2013, which aims to ensure that all young people under the 
age of 25 get a suitable job offer within four months of them leaving formal education or 
otherwise becoming unemployed. Although precise figures are impossible to determine until 
each EU country has defined exactly how it will implement the Youth Guarantee, research by 
the International Labour Office (ILO 2013) rates the benefits higher than the costs. The total 
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estimated cost of establishing Youth Guarantee schemes in the Eurozone countries is €21 
billion or 0.22 per cent of GDP. But inaction would be more costly. ‘NEET’ young people are 
estimated to cost the EU €153 billion (or 1.21 per cent of aggregate GDP) per year in benefits 
payments and foregone tax and earnings (Eurofund 2013). Moreover, the EU can top up 
spending on these schemes through the European Social Fund (ESF) under the €6 billion 
budget for the Youth Employment Initiative. 
Another ESF initiative, to tackle youth unemployment through mobility, is the 
‘Learning Network on Transnational Mobility Measures for Disadvantaged Youth and Young 
Adults’ (TLN Mobility). This is a partnership between 15 member-states and autonomous 
regions in Europe (Germany, Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic, Portugal, Ireland, Flanders, 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, and autonomous regions in Italy and Spain) to tackle youth 
unemployment through transnational mobility supported financially through their national and 
regional ESF programmes for 2014–2020. One example of an initiative under the TLN 
Mobility programme is the German IdA or ‘Integration through Exchange’ scheme. This 
supports young people who have difficulties entering or re-entering the labour market by 
enhancing their professional and training competences through a work-stay abroad. Priority is 
given to school and training-scheme drop-outs, youth with little or no formal qualification, 
young single mothers and young people with disabilities. 
For those with more training and higher levels of education, there are the well-known 
Erasmus schemes (broadened to Socrates, as well as the recent Erasmus+) for higher education, 
the Marie Curie schemes for doctoral and postdoctoral mobility, and the more vocationally 
oriented Leonardo and Gruntvig schemes for training and learning abroad.  
Regarding policy for supporting the integration of transnationally mobile young people, 
this is less developed at the intra-EU level, where the key policy initiatives are for integrating 
third-country migrants (see the review in King and Lulle 2016: 51–88). Unlike third-country 
nationals, it seems that EU migrants, benefiting from the principle of free movement, are 
expected to integrate themselves. However, in practice, intra-EU migrants do have their 
integration needs, especially as regards language and culture (King and Lulle 2016: 52, n22). 
In some countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, language courses are free, and EU migrants 
can join. In most other respects, however, intra-EU migrants’ real needs are overlooked, as 
they are caught in the no-man’s-land of free movement and equal treatment as native citizens 
on the one hand, and the special integration measures for non-European migrants on the other. 
Turning now to national-level policies, these are mainly put in place by countries which 
have witnessed either long-term or (as in the case of the post-2004 accession countries) recent 
large-scale emigration. The two main policy areas, from a state-initiated perspective, are to 
forge links with the diaspora and to promote return. But there are also bottom-up initiatives 
coming more from the side of the migrants and their organisations to maintain links with the 
home country and, via philanthropic, economic investment or cultural activities, to help 
promote its ‘development’. 
Increasingly, nowadays, countries with histories of emigration (‘emigration nations’; 
Collyer 2013) develop so-called diaspora policies (see, for example, Aikins and Russell 2013; 
Gray 2013; King and Melvin 1999; Marques and Góis 2013; Schain 1994). And although 
diaspora has a rather specific historical meaning relating to a combination of trauma and exile 
(Cohen 2008: 1–2), it seems nowadays to apply also to ‘scatterings’ of population created 
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through trade, colonialism or labour migration. The term ‘diaspora is also mobilised in the 
much more recent context of crisis-hit emigration, and countries label their recent emigrants as 
an evolving diaspora to avoid the negative connotations of the word ‘migrant’. Increasingly 
more European countries – especially, again, in Central and Eastern Europe – establish specific 
governmental departments responsible for the diaspora, and even designate ambassadors and 
ministers responsible for diaspora relations. In 2014, for instance, Ireland appointed a minister 
of state for the Irish diaspora. The minister’s main responsibility was strengthening ties with 
Irish youth abroad, especially recent emigrants with good education, with a further agenda of 
getting them either to return or to invest in the Irish economy from abroad. Nowadays, young 
and resourceful people living and working abroad are seen more and more as ‘lay diplomats’ 
who represent their country of origin (hopefully in a good light) and who may be an asset for 
transnational economic links and collaboration (King and Melvin 1999; Shain 1994). The key 
message underlying such political attention is the state’s wish to maintain links with its citizens 
abroad, tapping into their resources – financial, intellectual, emotional and political – and 
encourage their return migration, especially of the younger emigrant cohorts. 
Mentoring and training programmes for emigrant youth are especially popular for 
countries with large emigrant cohorts abroad. An example is the ‘Irish Executive Mentoring 
Programme’ which recently received funding from the Irish government to run a support 
scheme for emigrants to develop the talents required by Irish governmental and other state 
organisations. After the mentoring phase, young emigrants are invited to undertake job 
placements in Irish governmental organisations and then themselves become transnational 
mentors for young, educated Irish migrants worldwide. Other examples abound. Since 2012, 
Estonia operates a programme called Talendid Koju (Bring Talent Home), and Slovenia, which 
has an estimated 10 per cent of its researchers working abroad, likewise puts a special emphasis 
on the return migration of its researchers. Yet another example – since 2008, Slovakia operates 
a programme called ‘Slovensk Calling’ to attract back skilled and talented Slovakians, 
informing them of work opportunities in the country of origin. 
Finally, there are countless bottom-up initiatives of the migrants themselves, many of 
them based on the creative communicating and networking potential of the many forms of 
social media. These initiatives and associations are especially numerous amongst students 
studying abroad and amongst migrants and entrepreneurs with a business or philanthropic 
interest. Even individual blogs can be powerful voices in this field. For instance, in a blog 
called Io Torno Se, Antonio Siragusa collects stories of Italians who live abroad (see 
www.iotornose.it). This is a space for discussions about politics and the problems of starting 
good careers in Italy for young people (cf. Conti and King 2015). Siragusa emphasises that the 
blog was launched not just as a platform for complaints but in the hope that Italian politicians 
would listen to these voices and act on proposals that come from the emigrants themselves. 
Such grass-roots initiatives are perhaps ultimately more meaningful than top-down state-
bureaucratic policies because they are an expression of the individual ambition and enterprise 
that underpins the emigration process in the first place.  
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